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WHO WILL EDUCATE ME? USING THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO 
IMPROVE EDUCATIONAL ACCESS FOR 
INCARCERATED JUVENILES WITH 
DISABILITIES 
Abstract: Youth involved with the juvenile justice system present with a higher 
rate of disability, including mental illness and learning disabilities, than do non-
system-involved youth. These young people are often eligible for special educa-
tion services as provided by the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (“IDEA”). Eligible youth incarcerated in juvenile detention and correctional 
facilities, however, often fail to receive these services. Education advocates typi-
cally bring suits against school districts and correctional institutions alike under 
the IDEA’s mandate to provide a free appropriate public education to students 
with disabilities. Unfortunately, this approach is failing because the IDEA is not 
able to tackle other conditions within facilities that stand as barriers to education-
al access. The IDEA, however, is not the sole remedy available. The Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which reaches beyond the educational context 
and applies to more governmental entities than the IDEA, offers a more robust 
litigation avenue for enforcing the education rights of incarcerated youth with 
disabilities. Bringing suit under the ADA, therefore, either alone or in conjunc-
tion with the IDEA, could result in more consistent enforcement of incarcerated 
youths’ right to an education than bringing suit solely under the IDEA. 
INTRODUCTION 
For juveniles involved with the juvenile justice system, the school-to-
prison pipeline is more than a public policy problem—it is a very real, lived 
experience.1 Upwards of ninety percent of incarcerated juveniles exhibit emo-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Sabina E. Vaught, Juvenile Prison Schooling and Reentry: Disciplining Young Men of Col-
or, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 310, 310, 311 (Francine T. 
Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds., 2011) (highlighting how school exclusion policies, like zero 
tolerance, and special education diagnoses contribute to the racial disparities seen in juvenile incarcer-
ation, a trend known as the “school-to-prison pipeline”); Youth Involved with the Juvenile Justice 
System, YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/juvenile-justice/youth-involved-juvenile-justice-
system [https://perma.cc/62N5-DEZ5] (connecting school exclusionary practices, like suspension or 
expulsion, to increases in juvenile system involvement within a year). A juvenile who is found guilty 
of a crime or pleads guilty within the juvenile system is considered adjudicated delinquent and not 
labeled “convicted” as happens in the adult criminal justice system. Juvenile Court Terminology, 
NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., http://njdc.info/juvenile-court-terminology [https://perma.cc/R2NA-
KC9L] (providing definitions to key terms related to juvenile justice). Juveniles adjudicated delin-
quent may spend their sentence, also known as a disposition, in detention, which is a catch-all term for 
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tional impairment, and at least half may have a diagnosable emotional disabil-
ity.2 These problems often are exacerbated by the harsh conditions and lack of 
adequate support in facilities.3 Frequently, incarcerated juveniles have a histo-
ry of failing to achieve academic progress in and exclusion from mainstream 
school settings before their incarceration.4 A correctional facility that favors 
employing “restrictive security programs,” while restricting access to educa-
tional programs, fails to consider its legal mandates to provide an education 
with the appropriate accommodations for those with disabilities.5 In the school 
setting, litigators typically approach problems of special education access by 
bringing suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 
which guarantees a “free appropriate public education,” or a “FAPE,” for stu-
dents with disabilities.6 In the juvenile justice setting, however, the IDEA may 
                                                                                                                           
various levels of confinement both before and after adjudication for delinquency. Id. They may also 
be committed to state agency custody in a residential or correctional facility. Id. For the purposes of 
this Note, the term “juvenile justice facility” or “juvenile facility” will be used to discuss all confine-
ment settings for youth while “incarcerated juvenile” or “incarcerated youth” will be used to refer to 
those adjudicated. See LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP., HOW EFFECTIVE IS CORRECTIONAL 
EDUCATION, AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 21 (2014) (defining the term “incarcerated 
youth”); Juvenile Court Terminology, supra (defining terms used in the juvenile justice system). 
 2 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 1 at 22 (citing two 2003 studies discussing the emotional challenges 
facing incarcerated youth). 
 3 See id. at 22–23 (discussing the lack of satisfactory services endemic in juvenile justice facili-
ties). Throughout the 1990s, journalists and researchers exposed physical abuse, a lack of certified 
education programs, insufficient food rations, sewage problems, and overcrowding at several juvenile 
facilities. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 186–87 
(Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE] (depicting histori-
cal mistreatment within the juvenile justice system). In 2014, 50,821 juveniles were held in juvenile 
justice facilities. Charles Puzzanchera & Sarah Hockenberry, Data Reflect Changing Nature of Facili-
ty Populations, Characteristics, and Practices, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PRE-
VENTION (Aug. 2016), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/snapshots/DataSnapshot_JRFC2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XV3N-EVSF] (providing statistical trends on the operation of juvenile justice facili-
ties). Though the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”) reported a fifty-
percent decrease in overcrowding between 2000 and 2014, cases like G.F. v. Contra Costa County in 
2014 highlight ongoing mismanagement of juvenile facilities. See Statement of Interest of the United 
States of America at 5–6, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 3:13-cv-03667-MEJ (2014) [hereinafter 
Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty.] (describing an overuse of security measures with 
juveniles with disabilities); see also Puzzanchera & Hockenberry, supra (presenting data comparison 
on overcrowding for the years 2000 and 2014). 
 4 See Youth Involved with the Juvenile Justice System, supra note 1 (describing the history of poor 
academic outcomes and exclusions for system-involved youth). Statistically, life outcomes remain 
poor for incarcerated juveniles after release, with one study finding that “juvenile incarceration re-
duced offenders’ high school completion rates by thirteen percentage points and increased their adult 
incarceration rates by twenty-two percentage points.” DAVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 23. 
 5 See Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 6–7 (supporting that the 
allegations of incarcerated youth against a correctional facility, if true, are violations of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)). 
 6 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring 
access to a “free appropriate public education,” or “FAPE,” for all children with disabilities in the 
purposes of the act); see, e.g., Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993, 998–99 
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be less effective when used to challenge educational access in correctional fa-
cilities because other conditions of confinement that are not under the purview 
of the IDEA influence educational access.7 Instead, the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (“ADA”) could be a more effective advocacy tool than the IDEA 
when challenging education, or the lack thereof, as a condition of confinement 
because the ADA applies to the entire facility and not just its educational enti-
ty.8 This broader reach allows advocates to attack policies that keep incarcer-
ated juveniles with disabilities from exercising their educational rights and 
may even result in the closure of facilities egregiously ignoring the civil rights 
of their young inmates.9 
This Note explores the potential efficacy of the ADA to protect the educa-
tional rights of incarcerated juveniles with disabilities while they are serving 
their commitments.10 Part I of this Note will discuss the history of the right to a 
public education for students with disabilities in the United States.11 Part II 
                                                                                                                           
(2017) (bringing suit under the IDEA based on an alleged violation of a FAPE); Bd. of Educ. v. Row-
ley, 458 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (bringing suit under the IDEA based on an alleged violation of FAPE). 
 7 See, e.g., JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., UNLOCKING YOUTH: LEGAL STRATEGIES TO END SOLI-
TARY CONFINEMENT IN JUVENILE FACILITIES 22 (2017), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
2018-03/JLC_Solitary_ReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK7T-QBNB] (recommending that IDEA 
claims be used to challenge education throughout the facility and not as a way to provide some mini-
mum level of educational services to youth in solitary confinement). 
 8 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (defining the reach of 
Title II of the ADA to all public entities). 
 9 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 40–42, G.R. v. Foxhoven, 2018 WL 4701869 (S.D. Iowa 
June 28, 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00417) (challenging the widespread use of solitary confinement, includ-
ing the lack of educational materials available to boys so confined, and the unsanitary conditions of 
the facility’s cells as violations under the ADA); Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty, 
supra note 3, at 6–7 (challenging the facility’s use of restrictive security policies as violating educa-
tional rights for incarcerated students with disabilities under the IDEA and the ADA); FEIERMAN ET 
AL., supra note 7, at 4 (encouraging litigation to improve conditions under disability protections). 
Policies like solitary confinement keep incarcerated juveniles from accessing educational programs 
and disproportionately impact incarcerated juveniles with disabilities. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 4. In the last year, juvenile facilities employing solitary confinement have faced challenges on civil 
rights grounds in numerous states. Jessica Feierman, Karen U. Lindell & Natane Eaddy, Unlocking 
Youth: Legal Strategies to End Solitary Confinement in Juvenile Facilities (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://jlc.org/resources/unlocking-youth-legal-strategies-end-solitary-confinement-juvenile-facilities 
[https://perma.cc/AD87-NJAX] (discussing key developments in juvenile justice advocacy). Two 
facilities in Wisconsin are closing after constitutional challenges to their use of solitary confinement. 
Press Release, Juvenile Law Ctr. & ACLU of Wis., Following Class Action Civil Rights Lawsuit, 
Wisconsin Legislature to Close Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake (Mar. 22, 2018), https://jlc.org/sites/
default/files/attachments/2018-03/2018_3_22LHS%20Ready%20to%20release_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DQ76-7KEH] (revealing the outcome of lengthy investigations and litigation). Five states 
and the District of Columbia have undergone major campaigns to close several juvenile facilities. See 
generally SHEILA BEDI, YOUTH FIRST, BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
SUCCESSFUL STATE CAMPAIGNS TO CLOSE YOUTH PRISONS 5–11 (2017) (highlighting successful 
grassroots and legal campaigns in California, New York, Louisiana, Texas, the District of Columbia, 
and Mississippi). 
 10 See infra notes 15–205 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 15–68 and accompanying text. 
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will examine the intersection of disabilities and education in the juvenile jus-
tice context by charting the origins of juvenile justice to the current problems 
plaguing the system.12 Part III will describe the barriers that exist for incarcer-
ated juveniles with disabilities seeking to realize their right to an education 
while examining a new approach to facilities litigation made possible by the 
ADA.13 Part IV will argue that using the ADA as an advocacy tool can more 
expansively serve the educational needs of students with disabilities who are 
incarcerated and potentially revolutionize the juvenile justice landscape.14 
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR 
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Providing American youth with an education is an important public func-
tion entrusted to the states.15 Presently, each state constitution provides for the 
establishment of a public education system.16 State constitutional mandates 
have provided the legal basis for challenging certain state public education 
practices, namely school finance equity and more recently, teacher tenure.17 
Although twenty states have declared the right to an education to be funda-
mental, only nine state constitutions explicitly provide protections for students 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 69–114 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 115–181 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 182–205 and accompanying text. 
 15 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (debating whether pub-
lic education is a fundamental right as opposed to an important function); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (describing education as “the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments”). 
 16 Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and 
Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 582 (1996) (discussing the reliance on state constitutions 
for education-related civil rights litigation). By 1918, all states had compulsory attendance laws. 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 490 n.4. At different times throughout history, states have defined the contours of 
the right to a public education within their states, creating a patchwork of inconsistent rights for 
American youth. Emily Parker, 50-State Review: Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, 
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/constitutional-obligations-for-
public-education [https://perma.cc/5EFK-Q36Y] (reviewing the varied constitutional provisions for 
education of all fifty states); see also Francine T. Sherman & Hon. Jay Blitzman, Children’s Rights 
and Relationships: A Legal Framework, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 68, 72–73 (describing children’s law and rights as uniquely driven by local 
values distinct among the individual states). 
 17 See Reed, supra note 16, at 593–94 (finding that state education clauses are most often invoked 
when challenging a states’ school finance practices). Compare, e.g., Robert M. Jensen, Advancing 
Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 15, 18 (dis-
cussing the use of education clauses in state constitutions to raise claims of school finance inequities), 
with Note, Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 929, 929 (2015) (highlight-
ing new trends in the education advocacy arena in regards to using state constitutional provisions 
about public education). 
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with disabilities.18 These provisions are not necessarily expansive, and some 
reflect outdated understandings of disabilities.19 
Conversely, the United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee 
any right to a public education through the federal government.20 Instead, a 
confluence of federal legislation and case law has forged a broad regulatory 
scheme influencing state public education systems.21 Since the middle of the 
twentieth century, Congress and the federal courts have recognized historically 
disenfranchised students’ right to an equal opportunity to access a public edu-
cation.22 Empowered by the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress has 
tied federal grants for education to specific programmatic purposes for dec-
ades.23 In addition to these legislative prerogatives, the Supreme Court has in-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Kathleen B. Boundy & Joanne Karger, The Right to a Quality Education for Children and 
Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 286, 286 (characterizing state-based declarations of education as a funda-
mental right); Sherman & Blitzman, supra note 16, at 72–73 (characterizing state constitutions’ 
acknowledgement of education as a fundamental right); Parker, supra note 16, at 1 (identifying that 
some state constitutions provide for the education of students with disabilities). The nine states with 
protections for students with disabilities are: Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. Parker, supra note 16, at 1, 5, 8, 10, 12–14, 17, 21. 
 19 Parker, supra note 16, at 5, 8, 10, 12–14, 17, 21. For example, Indiana, Ohio, and West Virgin-
ia provide an education for the “insane and dumb.” Id. at 10, 17, 21. Arizona only explicitly mandates 
support for one category of disability—the “hearing and vision impaired.” Id. at 5. 
 20 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Supreme Court reasoned in Rodriguez that the right to an edu-
cation is not fundamental because it does not appear explicitly in the Constitution. Id. at 99 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 21 See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 2, 79 Stat. 
27, 27 (1965) (providing funds to states that provide a public education to low-income children); 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 495 (requiring states to desegregate public schools to remedy violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Sarah G. Boyce, Note, The Obsolescence of 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of the Federal Government’s Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1047 (2012) (juxtaposing the role of Congress and the Supreme Court in shifting 
state policies on public education). 
 22 See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 3, 89 
Stat. 773, 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012)) (providing federal funding 
for educational programs for children with disabilities for the first time); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 
(holding that the “separate but equal” violates students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the “educational facilities are inherently unequal”); Pa. Ass’n for 
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (approving a set-
tlement giving children with disabilities access to a public education where they had previously been 
denied such access). In Brown, in 1954, when abolishing “separate but equal” education facilities, the 
Supreme Court characterized the Fourteenth Amendment’s historical purpose alongside the slow de-
velopment of formalized public education systems in southern states after the Civil War as working 
together to forbid education to black children. 347 U.S. at 489–90. Then, in PARC, in 1972, when 
recognizing the educational rights of children with disabilities, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania discussed the exclusion of children with intellectual disabilities from 
public schools prior to the twentieth century and the eugenics movement’s furtherance of stigma 
against those with intellectual disabilities. 343 F. Supp. at 294. 
 23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (establishing Congress’s power to tax and spend); 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1411(a)(1) (West 2017) (providing grants to states for the education of students with disabilities); 
Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 702, 81 Stat. 783, 816 (1968) (providing federal fund-
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terpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as requiring equitable access to educational opportu-
nities for students on the margins of society.24 
Federal educational statutes range from specific protections for certain 
classes of students to sweeping attempts to regulate educational equity among 
the states.25 The first federal legislation to address public K-12 education in the 
United States was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
(“ESEA”).26 Passed in the wake of continuing de facto school segregation in 
the post-Brown landscape, the ESEA aimed to promote school equity by ap-
propriating federal money to support schools that served high-percentages of 
low-income students.27 
Section A of this Part examines the evolution of federal statutes with an 
emphasis on advancing the rights of children with disabilities.28 Section B con-
siders the federal judiciary’s role in advancing educational access, particularly 
through its interpretation of federal statutes to further define the right to an 
education for students with disabilities.29 
                                                                                                                           
ing for states and school districts that enact effective bilingual education programs for students from 
non-native English-speaking backgrounds); Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 2 (offering 
financial incentives to states and school districts serving high percentages of low-income students); 
Boyce, supra note 21, at 1047 (describing the scope of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause 
of the Constitution). By offering federal funds in exchange for compliance with federal statutory man-
dates or administrative programs, the federal government shapes education in public schools. Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 § 3; Bilingual Education Act § 702; Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act § 2; Boyce, supra note 21, at 1047. Furthermore, Congress established the 
Department of Education in 1867 to monitor the states’ public schools and provide input for improv-
ing them. An Act Establishing a Department of Education, Pub. L. No. 39-73, § 1, 14 Stat. 434, 434 
(1867) (establishing the first federal-level agency to oversee education throughout the country); An 
Overview of the U.S. Department of Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/focus/what.html [https://perma.cc/7KVF-ZW2B] (outlining the modern goals and responsi-
bilities of the U.S. Department of Education). 
 24 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (acknowledging inequality of English-only edu-
cation for non-English-speaking students against the mandates of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (forbidding segregation by race in public schools under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 25 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)–(d) (reaffirming a right to an education for students with disabil-
ities), with Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6601 (West 2017) (promoting teacher quality 
and accountability with funding-based incentives for states). 
 26 See generally Federal Programs for Education and Related Activities, in DIGEST OF EDUC. 
STATISTICS (2002), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003060d.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV5W-VDCX] 
(listing federal statutes addressing education). 
 27 Derek Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 
CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1317–18 (2017) (detailing the history of major federal education legislation). 
 28 See infra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 47–68 and accompanying text. 
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A. Federal Statutes on Disability and Education 
The federal government provides specific legal supports for protected 
classes, such as racial groups or persons with disabilities, in the context of pub-
lic education.30 Under the authority of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress passed the IDEA to provide students with disa-
bilities a constitutionally protected right to a public education that meets their 
needs.31 The IDEA outlines two major standards to ensure children with disa-
bilities access an education.32 First, states are required to provide students with 
a “free appropriate public education,” known as a “FAPE.”33 Second, students 
with disabilities must receive their education in the “least restrictive environ-
ment,” or “LRE.”34 How a school district meets these two requirements for a 
student with a disability is detailed in that child’s IDEA-required individual-
ized education program (“IEP”).35 The IDEA provides a blueprint for what the 
IEP must include, such as the student’s abilities, goals, and required services or 
accommodations to make progress, and how the IEP is created.36 The IDEA 
also mandates transition services for students with disabilities—services that 
support the child in transitioning from the secondary school setting to the ap-
propriate post-secondary option.37 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (discussing the importance of supporting the education of stu-
dents with disabilities); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 242, 252 (1964) 
(prohibiting federally-funded entities from discriminating because of race); 34 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2017) 
(applying Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly to the public education context). 
 31 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (providing a “free appropriate public education” to all children 
with disabilities); Steven N. Robinson, Note, Rowley, The Court’s First Interpretation of the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 941, 941–42, 942 n.8 (1983) 
(describing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 as Congress’s reaction to equal 
protection cases on the educational rights of students with disabilities). The Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975 was later renamed the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (naming the chap-
ter of the legislation). Part B of the IDEA provides for services for students ages three through twenty-
one. About IDEA, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://sites.ed.gov/idea/about-idea [https://perma.cc/SGE2-
MZMQ] (differentiating the services provided to specific populations). 
 32 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (West 2017) (outlining the IDEA requirements for states 
that seek funding eligibility). 
 33 Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). A “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) encompasses all services 
for special education that are free to the family and paid for by the public. Id. § 1401(9). These ser-
vices must meet the child’s needs as outlined in the child’s individualized education program (“IEP”). 
Id. 
 34 Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). In recent years, one of the primary goals of the IDEA is keeping students 
with disabilities in general education classrooms with non-special education peers as often and as 
much as possible. See About IDEA, supra note 31 (highlighting the rate of inclusion of students with 
disabilities in general education classrooms for the overwhelming majority of the school day). 
 35 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West 2017). States empower public school districts as the “local educa-
tional agency” to deliver the specialized education as mandated by the IDEA. Id. § 1401(19)(A). 
 36 Id. § 1414(d). 
 37 Id. § 1401(34). For some students, college or a vocational program is the next step, whereas 
other students require programs that allow them to continue learning how to live as independently as 
possible. See id. (outlining examples of post-secondary options and how to determine what is appro-
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Students with disabilities are also protected by two civil rights statutes, 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) and Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).38 Section 504 forbids 
discrimination against those with disabilities by any entity receiving federal 
funds, which includes but is not limited to public schools.39 Title II of the ADA 
reaches beyond Section 504 by protecting individuals with disabilities from 
discrimination by any state or local governmental entity, regardless of whether 
they receive federal monies.40 
The definition of disability in these two civil rights statutes is similar.41 
Under the ADA, a disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities.”42 In contrast, the definition of 
disability in the Rehabilitation Act varies based on its application within the 
statute.43 When defining disability for entities receiving federal grants, which 
includes the public education systems of the states, the Rehabilitation Act re-
lies on the ADA’s definition.44 The IDEA, however, has a narrow, categorical 
                                                                                                                           
priate for the child based on interests and abilities). Transition planning must be documented in the 
IEP beginning with the IEP that covers the child’s sixteenth birthday, though schools are welcome to 
begin planning earlier. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 38 About IDEA, supra note 31. The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights enforc-
es the rights of students with disabilities under these two federal legislative provisions, but not under 
the IDEA. Id. 
 39 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2017)) (providing disability discrimination protections); see 
also Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and the 
Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html [https://perma.cc/W2Z5-7BDJ] [hereinafter Protecting Students 
with Disabilities] (discussing the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) in the 
public education context). Section 504 prevents discrimination against any student with a physical or 
mental disability by a school that receives federal funding. Protecting Students with Disabilities, su-
pra. 
 40 State and Local Governments (Title II), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., https://
www.ada.gov/ada_title_II.htm [https://perma.cc/8QJ5-T4S8] (offering guidance on implementing 
Title II); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (banning discrimination on the basis of disability by any “public 
entity”). The ADA protects individuals with disabilities in much the same way as the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 protects individuals of other protected classes, like race and religion. Introduction to the ADA, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm [https://perma.cc/
T6BM-2WXF] (explaining the history of the ADA). 
 41 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (defining disability and its limitations on daily living in 
the ADA), with Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9) (West 2017) (defining disability and its 
limitations on employment opportunities in the Rehabilitation Act). 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). What constitutes a major life activity is also defined in the ADA with 
several non-limiting examples. Id. § 12102(2). 
 43 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9) (offering one definition for disability in the employment context and 
another for other applications). 
 44 See id. § 705(9)(B) (outlining the specific subchapters that assume the ADA’s definition); 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability). The ADA’s definition applies to the Rehabilitation Act’s 
subchapter containing the regulation known as Section 504. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9)(B) (applying 
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definition that applies only to children in the education setting.45 A student with a 
disability may bring a claim of disability-based discrimination, demonstrated by 
a lack of access to educational services to which he or she is entitled, under the 
ADA, Section 504, the IDEA, or any combination of the three statutes.46 
B. Major Federal Cases on Educational Access 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court ad-
vanced access to public primary and secondary education for marginalized 
populations using constitutional and statutory precedents.47 First, in 1954, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court unanimously held that “sepa-
rate but equal” educational provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.48 Two decades later, but preceding the enactment 
                                                                                                                           
the grant to subchapter V, including section 794, which is known by its session law name, Section 
504). 
 45 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A). The only disabilities or impairments that qualify a child for consid-
eration of special education services under the IDEA are: “intellectual disabilities, hearing impair-
ments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blind-
ness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, 
other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities.” Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). Additionally, the child 
must be found to require “special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii). 
 46 See, e.g., Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017) (bringing 
IDEA claims as parents of a child with autism); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 743, 
754, 758 (2017) (bringing ADA and Section 504 claims against a school district while discussing the 
impact of the IDEA on the disability claims); Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 39 
(discussing Section 504 enforcement). Congress has long recognized the overlap between federal 
disability and special education law. See Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disabil-
ity Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2015) (discussing changes made to the IDEA 
over thirty years ago to create symmetry with Section 504). 
 47 See, e.g., Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (relying on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as statutory precedent); 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The 
Court in Brown discussed its six prior “separate but equal” education cases. 347 U.S. at 483–84. The 
two involving primary and secondary schools did not address the constitutionality of the “separate but 
equal” doctrine while the other four dealt with issues in post-secondary education. Id. Therefore, 
Brown became the first successful case at the Supreme Court to strike down the “separate but equal” 
doctrine in the field of public primary and secondary education. Id. at 495. 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (establishing equal protection under the law for all persons); 
Brown, 343 U.S. at 495. This decision struck down “separate but equal” practices in public education 
as previously authorized by the Court’s precedent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Brown, 343 U.S. at 494–95; 
see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (recognizing the constitutionality of schools segre-
gated along racial lines). Brown was an amalgamation of four cases first brought in federal district 
courts challenging state-based statutes and constitutional provisions that allowed or required segregat-
ed schools. 343 U.S. at 486, 486 n.1. In all but one of the four cases, the district courts found that, 
though segregation may be harmful to children of color, so long as the educational facilities and re-
sources were made equal, the states’ legal provisions were valid. Id. at 488, 486 n.1. The Supreme 
Court viewed educational opportunity as inherent to the success of individuals and society. Id. at 483. 
The Court further considered segregation as potentially permanently damaging to the children of color 
who were separated from their white peers solely on the basis of race and that such separation could 
negatively affect their educational outcomes. Id. at 494. 
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of federal disabilities laws, federal courts ushered in an era of expanding edu-
cation rights beyond race to other disenfranchised groups.49 
In 1972, two federal district courts recognized the educational rights of 
students with disabilities.50 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania first heard Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Children (“PARC”) v. Pennsylvania, a case brought by parents of children with 
intellectual disabilities and PARC, a state-based advocacy group.51 PARC and 
the parents sought to stop the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from continuing 
to exclude children with intellectual disabilities from the public school sys-
tem.52 Because the parties settled during the proceedings, the district court af-
firmed the settlements and ordered an injunction.53 During the process of es-
                                                                                                                           
 49 See, e.g., Lau, 414 U.S. at 566, 568 (recognizing the rights of students whose primary language 
was Chinese); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the Board of 
Education of the District of Columbia violated the due process rights of students with disabilities); 
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302 (celebrating the settlement that guaranteed access to public education for 
all children with an intellectual disability in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania). 
 50 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302. At the time, students with intellectual 
disabilities were dubbed “mentally retarded,” though the latter term is no longer politically correct. 
See Change in Terminology: “Mental Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability,” 78 Fed. Reg. 148, 
46499 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 20 CFR pts. 404, 416) (adopting the term “intellectual disabil-
ity” in order to promote acceptance of those so affected). When discussing these cases, this Note uses 
the term “intellectual disability” where possible. See id. (replacing “mental retardation” with “intellec-
tual disability” throughout the rules of the Social Security Administration). 
 51 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281–82, 281 n.1. PARC and the parents of children with intellectual 
disabilities challenged four Pennsylvania statutes that operated in concert to exclude such children 
from public school systems. Id. at 282. Children with intellectual disabilities were excluded on the 
grounds that they were “uneducable and untrainable,” “had not attained a mental age of five years,” or 
would not benefit from education. Id. When children with intellectual disabilities were allowed to 
attend public schools, schools excluded the children who fell outside of the state’s compulsory educa-
tion range of ages “eight to seventeen.” Id. PARC and the parents of children with disabilities raised 
constitutional questions of due process and equal protection. Id. at 283. They contended that the lack 
of any hearing before the children’s deprivation of their right to an education—a right bestowed upon 
them by the Pennsylvania Constitution—denied the children due process as no “rational basis” existed 
for their exclusion under any of the four statutes. Id. 
 52 Id. at 283. Based on a 1965 state-issued report, roughly 60.3 to 63.5% of school-age children 
with intellectual disabilities were denied their right to a public education as guaranteed by the Penn-
sylvania Constitution. Id. at 296. 
 53 Id. at 293. During the initial proceedings, the parties settled on the issues of due process and 
equal protection. Id. at 284–88. The first agreement, which addressed due process, provided for a 
formal hearing with witnesses and evidence before any child could have their educational assignment 
changed or any child with an intellectual disability could be excluded from public education. Id. at 
284–85. The state offered four educational assignments for children with intellectual disabilities: 
“regular, retarded-educable, retarded-trainable, and uneducable-untrainable.” Id. at 283 n.7. The sec-
ond agreement, which addressed equal protection, ensured that all Pennsylvanian children with intel-
lectual disabilities between the ages of four and twenty-one would receive a public education. Id. at 
288. Subsequently, the court issued an injunction to enforce the settlement agreement. Id. at 288, & 
n.19. This injunction ensured that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its school districts would 
not apply or interpret the four statutes in a manner discriminatory against children with intellectual 
disabilities. See id. at 288. (detailing how the defendants could no longer apply or interpret the statutes 
to exclude children with intellectual disabilities from attending public schools). Even so, because the 
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tablishing its jurisdiction to affirm the settlements and order the injunction, the 
court held that the lack of a hearing before depriving a child with an intellectu-
al disability of a public education presented a valid claim under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The court also held that the plain-
tiffs brought a valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment based on the sheer number of children with intellectual disabili-
ties throughout the Commonwealth who were not receiving a proper public 
education, despite a constitutional mandate that a proper education is provided 
to all school-age children.55 
The United States District Court of the District of Columbia decided Mills 
v. Board of Education less than three months after PARC.56 In Mills, a group of 
students with intellectual and emotional disabilities alleged that the District of 
Columbia Public Schools were not providing children with disabilities with a 
public education in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, statutes of the District of Columbia, and the regulations of the school 
board.57 The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
required District of Columbia Public Schools to provide all students, regardless 
of disability, with an equal opportunity to a public education and conduct full 
                                                                                                                           
district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, it also evaluated the claims and is-
sued its own holding. Id. at 293. 
 54 Id. at 293, 295. 
 55 See id. at 296–97 (enumerating the tens of thousands of students who were excluded from pub-
lic education in Pennsylvania because of their intellectual disability, including those institutionalized 
or improperly housed in correctional facilities without access to proper educational programing). 
 56 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866 (issuing decision on Aug. 1, 1972); PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 279 
(issuing decision on May 5, 1972). 
 57 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868, 871 (describing the plaintiffs’ prayer for relief and the defend-
ants’ acknowledgement of their failure to provide what the law required of them). Although some of 
minor-plaintiffs were deemed to have intellectual disabilities, others were regarded as “emotionally 
disturbed or hyperactive.” Id. In D.C., children requiring additional educational services because of a 
disability had been labeled “exceptional.” Id. Each party offered data that supported to varying de-
grees the claim that children with disabilities were not being educated in the D.C. school system. Id. at 
868–69. The plaintiffs estimated that 18,000 of 22,000 children with intellectual, emotional, and 
learning disabilities failed to receive the proper educational supports. Id. at 868. The Board of Educa-
tion of the District of Columbia estimated that 12,340 children with disabilities were denied services 
during the previous school year while fewer than 4,000 children received those services. Id. at 868–
69. The seven named plaintiffs had all been excluded from the D.C. Public Schools without hearings 
or any process for reviewing whether they could return. Id. at 869–70. Two students had never been 
allowed to attend the D.C. public school system because of their intellectual disabilities, an outcome 
reminiscent of the exclusions based on statutory application and interpretation discussed in the PARC 
case. See id. at 869–70 (relating the enrollment denials for George Liddell, Jr., who was eight at the 
time of the lawsuit, and Janice King, who was thirteen); PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282 (detailing the 
Pennsylvania statutes used to exclude children with intellectual disabilities from attending public 
schools). Once excluded from their public schools without any opportunity to return, nearly all the 
students were unable to access any educational services, as their families could not afford private 
schools and children remained on waiting lists for funding programs. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 869–70. 
The school district stipulated to failing to fulfill its obligation to educate school-aged children with 
disabilities according to their needs as well as failing to provide them with due process. Id. at 871. 
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due process hearings before students with disabilities were deprived of educa-
tional opportunities.58 Three years later, PARC and Mills led to the passage of the 
Education for Handicapped Children Act of 1975, now known as the IDEA.59 
After the passage of the IDEA, the Supreme Court examined the contours 
of the right to an education for students with disabilities in regards to the stat-
ute’s “free appropriate public education,” or “FAPE” standard.60 In 1982, in 
Board of Education v. Rowley, the parents of Amy Rowley, a student with a 
hearing impairment, alleged that she was denied a FAPE because the school 
district would not provide Amy with a sign-language interpreter.61 The Su-
preme Court held that a FAPE is an education “reasonably calculated to enable 
the child to receive educational benefits” and that Amy had been provided at 
least that level of education, if not more.62 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875. The Fifth, and not the Fourteenth, Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause applies to the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing due process before 
deprivation of a right); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recognizing the applicability of 
the Fifth Amendment to the District of Columbia). The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia relied on its precedent in Hobson v. Hansen from 1967 to envelope the claim on equal pro-
tection within the due process claim. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (citing Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)). The court in Hobson held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment required equal educational opportunities for children regardless of their socioeconomic 
status. Id.; Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 493. Applying that same logic, the court found in Mills that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required equal protection and procedural due process for 
students with disabilities. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875, 876. The court also found that the District of 
Columbia Public Schools were violating their own rules and applicable statutes by failing to educate 
school-aged children with disabilities. Id. at 874. 
 59 SPECIAL EDUCATION PUBLIC POLICY, PROJECT IDEAL, TEX. COUNCIL FOR DEV. DISABILI-
TIES, http://www.projectidealonline.org/v/special-education-public-policy [https://perma.cc/N3YQ-
P3EU] (elucidating the judiciary’s impact on passing a legislative enactment to protect students with 
disabilities); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 194 (emphasizing the role of the PARC and Mills cases 
when drafting the original version of the IDEA). Although federal district courts and later Congress 
expanded educational access for students with disabilities, the Supreme Court recognized the rights of 
non-English-speaking students in accessing education in 1974, in Lau v. Nichols. 414 U.S. at 566. 
Though neither Congress nor the Court recognize the existence of a federal right to education for all 
students, both institutions have developed legal protections for specific student populations. See, e.g., 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35, to reinforce that public 
education is a not a right recognized by the United States Constitution); Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (advanc-
ing educational rights for non-English-speaking students); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (advancing educa-
tional rights for racial minorities). 
 60 See Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 993 (addressing what adequately constitutes a “free appropriate pub-
lic education” under the IDEA for students with disabilities); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (setting the 
minimum standard for a “free appropriate public education” under the IDEA). 
 61 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. The district provided Amy with other supports, however, and she was 
excelling in school, even surpassing some of her peers without disabilities. Id. at 184, 185. 
 62 Id. at 202, 207, 209–10. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
and the Second Circuit found that Amy had been denied a FAPE because a FAPE required “an oppor-
tunity to achieve [one’s] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.” 
Id. at 185–86. 
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The Supreme Court did not extend its definition a FAPE beyond the facts 
of Rowley, however.63 Thus, in 2017, in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School 
District RE-1 (“Endrew”), the Court grappled with the question of how much 
educational benefit constitutes a FAPE for a child with a disability.64 The par-
ents of Endrew F., a child with autism, alleged that the Douglas County School 
District had failed to deliver upon their son’s right to a FAPE as required by 
the IDEA.65 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Roberts held that a 
FAPE’s “educational benefits” adequacy threshold had to be more than “any 
educational benefit.”66 The Court rephrased the FAPE standard from Rowley as 
“an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in 
light of the child’s circumstances.”67 Thus, providing the opportunity to make 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Id. at 202. The Court found that testing whether the FAPE standard is met is very fact-specific 
because implementation of this standard must vary based on the individual child’s needs according to 
other provisions in the IDEA. Id. at 201–02. Because Amy was performing significantly better than 
“passing,” the Court found that her IEP was “reasonably calculated” to allow her to receive a FAPE. 
Id. at 209–10. 
 64 Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 993, 998. This question was less about the definition of a FAPE under 
the IDEA and more about how to measure a FAPE’s adequacy. Id. at 998. For instance, for a student 
like Amy Rowley, who was receiving personalized instruction in her general education classroom, 
determining whether she had received the benefits of a FAPE was measured by whether she passed 
and moved to the next grade. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204. 
 65 Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 997. Because Endrew had a diagnosis of a qualifying disability under the 
IDEA and lived in a state that accepted the IDEA funding, he was owed a FAPE as provided by his 
school district under the IDEA. Id. at 996. Endrew’s parents believed their son was denied a FAPE 
when his IEPs failed to result in his academic or behavioral growth and the goals and approaches 
outlined in the IEPs remained largely unchanged from kindergarten through fifth grade. Id. at 996–97. 
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the Colorado Department of Education, ruled in favor of 
the school district, finding that a FAPE had been provided. Id. at 997. Judges in both the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s judgment. Id. 
 66 Id. at 998. The district court used the “reasonably calculated” standard from Rowley, applying 
it to Endrew’s case to mean that his IEP had to be “reasonably calculated” to provide for some pro-
gress, albeit a minimal amount. Id. at 997. The Tenth Circuit construed the “reasonably calculated” 
standard as providing for more than a trivial amount of progress. See id. at 997 (applying its applica-
tion of the Rowley standard as “more than de minimis”); De Minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining the standard used by the court as “trifling” or “negligible”). Endrew’s par-
ents sought an even higher standard than that promulgated by the Supreme Court in Rowley—a stand-
ard the Court ultimately refined in Endrew. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1001. Endrew’s parents wanted a 
FAPE to mean an education that was “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children with-
out disabilities.” Id. The Supreme Court had denied the application of that standard in Rowley, how-
ever, and refused to reconsider. Id. 
 67 Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 999. This phrasing highlighted the individualized, fact-specific nature of 
reasonableness and adequacy inquiries. See id. (discussing the purpose of the IEP as tailored to each 
student to ensure progress). The Court did not determine whether Endrew’s IEP was designed for him 
to make effective progress or even whether he was making effective progress in his public school but 
instead vacated and remanded the Tenth Circuit’s decision so that these questions could be revisited. 
See id. at 1001–02 (discussing the role of the courts as opposed to relying upon the expertise of school 
officials and providing the disposition). 
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adequate progress meant setting “appropriately ambitious” goals for each 
child.68 
II. EDUCATION & DISABILITY IN JUVENILE JUSTICE FACILITIES 
Education plays an especially important role in the juvenile justice sys-
tem—not only is an incarcerated juvenile still entitled to receive an education, 
but providing that education promotes the system’s core goal of rehabilita-
tion.69 Education services, however, are not uniform across states or even 
among juvenile justice facilities in the same state.70 Not only is the education 
inconsistent, but it is also often insufficient or non-existent for this vulnerable, 
incarcerated population.71 
Section A explores the history of the juvenile justice system and its origi-
nal goal of rehabilitation.72 Section B discusses the operation of juvenile jus-
tice facilities and how education and disability intersect within that context.73 
Section C highlights the disproportionate occurrence of disabilities in juveniles 
in the justice system, magnifying the need for proper support for incarcerated 
juveniles with disabilities.74 
A. A Brief History of the Juvenile Justice System 
Today’s juvenile justice system encompasses facilities that house juveniles 
in prison-like settings, facilities that house juveniles in residential settings like 
group homes and care facilities, and courts and state agencies that serve the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 1000. The Court seemingly focused on bridging the divide between students, like Amy 
Rowley, who were successful in a general education classroom with the proper supports, and students 
who would be unable to remain in the general education classroom. See id. at 1000–01 (comparing the 
facts of Rowley with the Tenth Circuit’s use of the de minimis standard to measure adequate progress). 
The Court also repeated a caveat it delivered in Rowley—not all students with disabilities who were 
advanced to the next grade level were de facto receiving a FAPE. Id. at 1000 n.2. 
 69 See Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 287, 300 (categorizing fulfilling the right to an educa-
tion as critical to rehabilitation); Katherine Twomey, Note, The Right to Education in Juvenile Deten-
tion Under State Constitutions, 94 VA. L. REV. 765, 799 (2008) (positing that education is a rehabilita-
tive tool. 
 70 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 155, 178. Because creating a public edu-
cation system lies with the individual states, each state’s right to an education is unique. Boundy & 
Karger, supra note 18, at 286. For the twenty states that recognize education as a fundamental right, 
education can only be taken away in the face of a “compelling state interest.” Id. Because of these 
state-by-state variations, terminology may not be used consistently. See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 155, 156 (explaining the localized individuality of juvenile justice systems 
alongside various terminology used to describe it). 
 71 PETER LEONE & LOIS WEINBERG, ADDRESSING THE UNMET EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF CHIL-
DREN AND YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS 21 (2010) (discussing 
the inadequacies of education in the juvenile justice system, including at times, a lack of services). 
 72 See infra notes 75–88 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 89–101 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 102–114 and accompanying text. 
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needs of juveniles.75 The early juvenile justice system evolved around pre-
existing reform schools, also known as training schools, and institutions.76 
Among the first institutions were the New York House of Refuge and the Chica-
go Reform School, established, respectively, in 1825 and 1855.77 Shortly 
thereafter, the first juvenile court in the United States was established in Chicago 
in 1899.78 The purpose of the specialized court was to provide youth with reha-
bilitative rather than punitive services.79 Prior to these systems, juveniles moved 
through the adult criminal justice system and were subjected to incredibly inhu-
mane conditions.80 Children could even be executed for certain crimes.81 
Though the development of the nascent juvenile justice system was 
focused on rehabilitation, the implementation of the system was rife with 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 156 (defining “juvenile justice sys-
tem” narrowly and broadly); Pam Clark, Types of Facilities, in DESKTOP GUIDE TO QUALITY PRAC-
TICE FOR WORKING WITH YOUTH IN CONFINEMENT 1, 2 (2014), https://info.nicic.gov/dtg/print/4 
[https://perma.cc/G59F-RACX] (using traditional delineations of security settings in juvenile facili-
ties, such as maximum and minimum security). For the purposes of this Note, the term “juvenile jus-
tice system” encompasses the juvenile courts and facilities in which juveniles are housed exclusively. 
See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 156 (providing narrow and expansive defi-
nitions of the term “juvenile justice”); Clark, supra, at 1, 4. This Note refers to modern-day juvenile 
detention centers and correctional facilities collectively as juvenile justice facilities and specifically as 
detention centers or correctional facilities when a distinction must be made. See JUVENILE CRIME, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 156 (including juvenile facilities in an expansive definition of 
“juvenile justice”). Detention centers generally refer to short-term stay facilities that tend to house 
juveniles before they go through their juvenile court proceedings. Clark, supra, at 4. Correctional 
facilities may house juveniles for longer periods of time and tend to be used post-adjudication. Id. 
Both detention and correctional facilities provide education services. Id. Juvenile offenders in juvenile 
facilities are not labeled convicted of crimes but rather are “adjudicated delinquent.” JUVENILE 
CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 154. Unlike adults, juveniles may be adjudicated for “sta-
tus offenses,” which are acts that are considered unlawful because of the offender’s age. Id. at 162. A 
common example of a status offense is “running away from home.” Id. 
 76 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 154; ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., DIA-
LOGUE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE 5 (2007) (depicting the roots and evolution of the juvenile justice 
system). 
 77 ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 76, at 5. 
 78 Kristi Holsinger, Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: Characteristics and Patterns of In-
volvement, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 
24 (providing the underpinnings of the juvenile justice system as a means of analyzing key statistical 
figures reflecting the current state of juvenile justice). Chicago was the site of the first juvenile court 
in 1899, and by 1925, all but two states had a juvenile court. JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
supra note 3, at 157. An estimated 3,000 juvenile courts are in operation in the United States today. 
Holsinger, supra, at 25. 
 79 See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE supra note 3, at 157–58 (describing early juvenile 
justice systems); Holsinger, supra note 78, at 24 (describing the history of juvenile delinquency and 
its treatment during this reform period. The shift toward non-criminal juvenile courts also coincided 
with an expansion of social reforms and welfare-related services. JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, supra note 3, at 157. 
 80 See Vincent Schiraldi, Marc Schindler & Sean J. Goliday, The End of the Reform School?, in 
JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 409, 410 (illus-
trating strict punishments undifferentiated between adults and youth). 
 81 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 157. 
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abuse, as evidenced by the harsh conditions within juvenile justice facilities.82 
Juvenile justice reformers of the 1960s and 1970s sought to eradicate abuses of 
power and remedy deplorable conditions in facilities.83 One of their reforms 
removed youth who were in the custody of the state due to child abuse or ne-
glect from the juvenile justice system.84 As a result of the reformers’ efforts, 
Congress passed the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
(“JJDPA”), the first federal legislative oversight of state juvenile justice facili-
ties.85 JJDPA sought to improve the conditions in juvenile facilities throughout 
the country and iron out inconsistencies among the various local and state ju-
venile systems.86 The JJDPA also established the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”) within the Department of Justice to over-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Patrick McCarthy et al., The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to 
the Youth Prison Model, 2 NEW THINKING IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS BULL. 1, 2 (2016), https://
chronicleofsocialchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/The-Future-of-Youth-Justice.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4Y8Q-TUAA] (portraying conditions of living at a reform school). 
 83 See, e.g., Juvenile Corrections Reform in Massachusetts, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, http://www.cjcj.org/Education1/Massachusetts-Training-Schools.html [https://perma.cc/3MMU-
XSKQ] (describing the shuttering of the Massachusetts reform schools in favor of a community-
based, decentralized system that remains in place to this day). 
 84 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 160; Holsinger, supra note 78, at 24–25. 
 85 What Is the JJDPA?, ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.act4jj.org/what-jjdpa [https://
perma.cc/C2ED-T4ST] (outlining the purpose of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
(“JJDPA”)); see Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 101, 
88 Stat. 1109, 1109–10 (1974) (addressing the needs of the youth demographics who are frequently 
entangled with the juvenile justice system). Congress reauthorized the JJDPA on December 13, 2018. 
Press Release, Campaign for Youth Justice, Congress Unanimously Passes Bipartisan Bill to 
Strengthen Federal Juvenile Justice Law (Dec. 13, 2018), http://cfyj.org/news/cfyj-news-press-
releases/item/congress-unanimously-passes-bipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-federal-juvenile-justice-law 
[https://perma.cc/J4VL-4L7S]. The JJDPA works through the same mechanism of block grant incen-
tives as the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Marsha Weissman et al., The Right 
to an Education in the Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States 1 (Dec. 31, 2008) 
(submission to Vernor Muñoz, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Educ., Human Rights Council, 
United Nations) (explaining federal requirements imposed on states accepting federal monies). The 
JJDPA currently requires facilities receiving federal dollars to meet four criteria. State Compliance 
with JJDP Act Core Requirements, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/compliancedata.html [https://perma.cc/33HW-N73H] (outlining 
the federal requirements set for states in order to receive JJDPA funding). The four criteria are: the 
“deinstitutionalization of status offenders,” “adult jail and lock-up removal,” “‘sight and sound’ sepa-
ration,” and “disproportionate minority contact.” Id. These criteria aim to keep incarcerated juveniles 
separated from adult offenders, divert juveniles adjudicated for offenses like truancy away from juve-
nile facilities, and diminish the racial disparity in juvenile facilities. Id. 
 86 What Is the JJDPA?, supra note 85; see Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act § 101 
(presenting Congress’s findings that led to enacting federal oversight). The 2018 reauthorization of 
JJDPA, titled the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, addresses education explicitly in the JJDPA 
for the first time, though special education services are not mentioned. See Pub. L. No. 115-385, 
§ 205(1)(R) (providing for three new requirements related to educational attainment for incarcerated 
juveniles). 
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see these reforms.87 With the advent of the “tough on crime” years of the 1980s 
and 1990s, several states redefined their juvenile justice systems with an empha-
sis on crime eradication and public safety instead of juvenile rehabilitation.88 
B. Education as a Condition of Confinement in Juvenile Justice Facilities 
Education is consistently recognized as a productive component of any 
juvenile justice facility.89 Though non-binding, a set of standards known by the 
acronym “CHAPTERS” serves as a rubric for juvenile justice facilities to 
evaluate the quality of the conditions of confinement under seven key catego-
ries.90 Education plays a major role in evaluating “P,” which stands for “pro-
                                                                                                                           
 87 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act § 201 (providing for the creation of an office 
within the Department of Justice to manage programs under JJDPA); Legislation/JJDP Act, OFFICE 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PROT., https://www.ojjdp.gov/about/legislation.html [https://
perma.cc/YG5W-AXV4] (highlighting major changes to the JJDPA and its implementation). 
 88 See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE supra note 3, at 155 (discussing a general change in 
society’s outlook toward juvenile crime while seventeen states explicitly changed the focus of the 
juvenile justice systems to be more punitive). The original passage of JJDPA in 1974 focused on re-
moving status offenders from juvenile justice institutions and separating juvenile and adult offenders 
in lock-up. Id. at 161. By the 1990s, states had reversed these reforms, making it easier to try juveniles 
and adults and renewing a focus on stopping youth-committed violent crimes. Id. Meanwhile, Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (“CRIPA”), which applies to all 
incarcerated persons, including juveniles. Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-247, § 2(1)(B)(iv), 94 Stat. 349, 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997(1)(B)(iv) (2012)) (implementing federal legislation to protect the rights of persons in a wide 
array of institutional settings, including the juvenile justice system). Under CRIPA, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice’s Civil Rights Division can monitor state and local juvenile justice facilities for civil 
rights abuses and remedy systemic issues. See Rights of Persons Confined to Jails and Prisons, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/rights-persons-confined-jails-and-prisons [https://perma.
cc/2WCM-WH4C] (discussing scope of oversight). When investigating juvenile facilities, the De-
partment of Justice may also rely on the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 34 
U.S.C. § 12601 (2012) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141) (defining causes of action that may 
be brought under the act); Rights of Persons Confined to Jails and Prisons, supra. This act explicitly 
forbids the systemic deprivation of rights of incarcerated juveniles by any government employee or 
entity. 34 U.S.C. § 12601. 
 89 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 189 (highlighting the nearly 
100% compliance of all juvenile facilities with offering educational services); JUVENILE DET. ALTER-
NATIVES INITIATIVE, JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITY ASSESSMENT 5 (2014) (discussing educational 
services under programming). 
 90 See Michael J. Dale et al., Legal Rights of Children in Institutions, in 1 REPRESENTING THE 
CHILD CLIENT § 2.01[1] (3d ed., 2017) (explaining the use of the CHAPTERS standards); JUVENILE 
DET. ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 5–7 (outlining changes to the CHAPTERS rubric). 
CHAPTERS stands for “classification and intake,” “health and mental health,” “access,” “program-
ming,” “training and supervision of staff,” “environment,” “restraints, room confinement, due process, 
and grievances,” and “safety.” JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 5–7. The 
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (“JDAI”) contracts with juvenile facilities to help them meet 
the “CHAPTERS” standards. Id. at 3, 5–7. The JDAI currently works with “more than 250 counties 
. . . across 39 states and District of Columbia” to reform juvenile justice facilities. RICHARD A. MEN-
DEL, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2014) (highlighting the 
investigative findings of the JDAI). 
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gramming.”91 The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (“JDAI”) has a set 
of questions that it recommends evaluators use to probe the adequacy of edu-
cation services, including specific questions on special education.92 Some of 
the questions correspond to the use of disciplinary policies with those who 
have disabilities.93 One of the challenges with providing education to incarcer-
ated juveniles, regardless of disability status, is the structure of the education 
system within facilities.94 Whereas the state corrections agency oversees the 
management of the facility—notably the facility’s disciplinary systems—the 
state’s education agency may be tasked with either providing education to all 
incarcerated juveniles or only to those requiring special education services un-
der the IDEA.95 
Incarcerated juveniles with disabilities are entitled to exercise their feder-
al statutory rights to a public education.96 As safeguards against discrimination 
on the basis of disability by public entities, the ADA and Section 504 still ap-
ply to students in local and state juvenile justice facilities.97 Even so, whether 
the IDEA still applies may depend upon the age of the incarcerated youth and 
if intersecting state laws limit the application of the IDEA.98 In 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice partnered to 
promulgate a report on best practices for juvenile justice systems throughout 
the country.99 These agencies recommended providing students in juvenile fa-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Dale et al., supra note 90, § 2.01[5][a] (discussing the role of education in juvenile pro-
gramming); JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 5 (providing an update on 
the standard related to special education). Education programming must be provided in some fashion, 
whether by the facility itself or through the state’s system of public education. ARNE DUNCAN & ERIC 
HOLDER, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING 
HIGH-QUALITY EDUCATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SECURE CARE SETTINGS 2 (Dec. 2014), https://
www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/correctional-education/guiding-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X4N-
TTEB] (describing the status of education in juvenile justice facilities). 
 92 JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 56–61. 
 93 Id. at 60–61. The JDAI uses the term “room confinement” as a pseudonym for solitary con-
finement and defines it as “the involuntary restriction of a youth alone in a cell, room, or other area.” 
Id. at 92. 
 94 Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 302–03. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at xvi (distinguishing correctional education programs for 
incarcerated juveniles from those for incarcerated adults with the advancement of the right to educa-
tion). When juveniles are sent to adult prison facilities, this right remains. Id. This Note focuses on 
juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities and the educational services provided therein. See, e.g., 
JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 189 (indicating nearly all juvenile facilities 
have educational programming). 
 97 DUNCAN & HOLDER, supra note 91, at 3. 
 98 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (West 2017). For 
example, states may not need to provide special education services in adult facilities to persons aged 
eighteen through twenty-one who were not first found eligible for services under the IDEA while at 
the school they last attended. Id. 
 99 See, e.g., DUNCAN & HOLDER, supra note 91, at iv (setting forth recommendations centered on 
educational attainment through a variety of means for youth while in detention or correctional facili-
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cilities with the same educational attainment opportunities as their non-
detained counterparts.100 The Department of Justice has also filed statements of 
interest in class action suits in support of sanctions against local educational 
agencies and correctional facilities that are not providing adequate educational 
opportunities to their juvenile inmates, especially those with disabilities.101 
C. The Prevalence of Disabilities Within the Juvenile Justice System 
Learning disabilities and mental illnesses are much more prevalent among 
youth involved in juvenile justice.102 Recent studies find seventeen to fifty-
three percent of system-involved youth have a learning disability.103 By con-
trast, children aged zero to eighteen exhibit learning disabilities at roughly two 
to ten percent of the general population of the United States.104 Emotional dis-
abilities appear in forty-seven percent of incarcerated youth as compared to 
eight percent of the nation’s school system population.105 The statistics for 
mental illness are just as staggering.106 An estimated sixty-five percent of girls 
in juvenile residential detention facilities have two or more mental illnesses 
while the rate for boys is seventy percent.107 Overall, between sixty-five and 
                                                                                                                           
ties). This report provides recommendations for reform but does not appear to be binding. See id. at iv, 
2, 23 (framing the content of the report as “suggestions” to better support juvenile justice facilities, 
which tend to be managed by states). 
 100 Id. at iv. 
 101 See, e.g., Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 13 (affirming that 
the behavior and policies alleged by the incarcerated juveniles’ complaint would violate the IDEA and 
ADA if their allegations were taken as true). 
 102 Marty Beyer, A Developmental View of Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 3, 11 (analyzing the im-
pact of learning disabilities on the involvement of youth with the juvenile justice system); Holsinger, 
supra note 78, at 39. 
 103 Beyer, supra note 102, at 11. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Holsinger, supra note 78, at 39. 
 106 See, e.g., ROBERT L. LISTENBEE & JOE TORRE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NA-
TIONAL TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 174 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/
defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQJ9-7QEC] (highlighting the prevalence of 
mental illness in incarcerated youth). 
 107 Id. A 2006 study mirrors these gender-based distinctions, finding seventy-nine percent of in-
carcerated juveniles had at least two mental illnesses while sixty percent had at least three. See Paula 
Braverman & Robert Morris, The Health of Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 44, 52 (discussing the mental 
health and substance abuse needs of incarcerated youth). One estimate places the rate of mental illness 
for incarcerated juveniles between fifty and one hundred percent, especially when including “disrup-
tive behavior disorders,” though these disorders could represent behaviors that an adolescent will age 
out of. Id. at 50. By comparison, the rates of mental illness for non-incarcerated youth range from 
about six to forty-one percent with an average rate of sixteen-and-a-half percent. Id. 
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seventy percent of juvenile justice system-involved youth could be eligible for 
protection against discrimination under the ADA.108 
For youth involved in the juvenile justice system, the manifestation of 
their disabilities is easily criminalized within the walls of the juvenile justice 
facility.109 The criminalization of disabilities does not begin within the juvenile 
justice system, however.110 These juveniles may have presented in school with 
an undiagnosed mental illness, causing behaviors that ultimately resulted in 
out-of-school suspension or expulsion.111 School exclusion increases the like-
lihood of a student’s introduction to the juvenile justice system.112 Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, ORPHANAGES, TRAINING SCHOOLS, REFORM 
SCHOOLS AND NOW THIS? 7 (2005), http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Issues/Juvenile_Justice/
NDRN_-_Juvenile_Justice_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN7T-Q2B8] (estimating the rate of those 
who would “meet the criteria for a disability”). The rate of disability in the general population is three 
times less than that for youth involved in the juvenile justice population. Id. 
 109 See, e.g., FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 15 (considering the effect of solitary confinement 
policies on incarcerated juveniles with disabilities). Incarcerated youth with disabilities are more like-
ly to be placed in solitary confinement because of behaviors stemming from their disabilities or 
through a justification of safety for themselves or others in lieu of proper treatment. Id. A class action 
lawsuit in California brought by incarcerated youth with disabilities centered on the use of solitary 
confinement in a discriminatory manner. Lawsuit Details Solitary Confinement and Failure to Edu-
cate Young People with Disabilities in Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall, DISABILITY RIGHTS AD-
VOCATES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://dralegal.org/press/lawsuit-details-solitary-confinement-and-failure-to-
educate-young-people-with-disabilities-in-Contra-Costa-County-juvenile-hall [https://perma.cc/754E-
4CZX] (promoting the causes of action for impact litigation related to education in a juvenile justice 
facility); see also Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 6–7 (outlining 
plaintiffs’ claims that they were “disproportionately burdened” by the use of solitary confinement 
policies because they had disabilities). For a discussion of G.F. v. Contra Costa County, see Part III.C 
of this Note. See infra notes 160–181 and accompanying text. 
 110 See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 85–86 (correlating suspension with 
learning disabilities); Vaught, supra note 1, at 310–11 (discussing school-based practices that lead to 
greater risk of involvement with the juvenile justice system). 
 111 Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 299–300; JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra 
note 3, at 85–86 (correlating suspension with learning disabilities). Students with disabilities are enti-
tled to procedural safeguards that protect against their removal from school because of the manifesta-
tion of their disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(E) (2012) (ensuring procedural safeguards for students 
who seek protection under the IDEA). These safeguards are known as manifestation hearings. Id. A 
student may not be removed for more than ten school days total for behavior related to the disability 
unless certain procedures are followed to better support the child and prevent the behavior in the fu-
ture. Id. § 1415(k)(B). An exception to this ten-day limit is if the student engages in behavior involv-
ing a weapon or illegal drugs or causes “serious bodily injury” to someone while at school, at which 
point the student may be given an alternative education placement for up to forty-five days. Id. 
§ 1415(k)(G). 
 112 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 85–87. Incarcerated youth, especially 
youth of color and youth from low-income backgrounds, often fall victim to several pitfalls within the 
public education system, including an overreliance on “zero tolerance policies” and low-quality 
schooling. See Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 298–99 (discussing the creation of the school-to-
prison pipeline at the school level). Beyond suspensions and expulsions, incarcerated youth also tend 
to have poor grades and poor attendance records and are more likely to drop out. Id. at 298. School 
exclusion and dropping out both increase rates of adult incarceration. Id.; JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 87. 
2019] Who Will Educate Me? 693 
students’ behaviors that are a direct byproduct of a disability have resulted in 
incarceration.113 Once confined to a juvenile facility, system-involved youth 
may not find the treatment or educational support they require to address their 
mental health needs or disability.114 
III. THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO ADVANCING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF 
INCARCERATED JUVENILES WITH DISABILITIES 
For advocates seeking to improve education conditions in juvenile facili-
ties, several obstacles stand in the way.115 First, a federal statute on incarcera-
tion—the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”)—heavily restricts 
inmates’ ability to challenge prison conditions in the courts.116 The IDEA and 
the judiciary’s interpretation of its administrative remedies provision have cre-
ated confusion as to what avenues of relief must be pursued under the IDEA 
before filing a civil rights lawsuit, even if the rights asserted in that lawsuit do 
not stem from the IDEA.117 Meanwhile, litigation using the ADA to challenge 
educational access as a condition of confinement for incarcerated juveniles 
with disabilities is a relatively new strategy.118 
Section A of this Part discusses the statutory construction challenges fac-
ing advocates trying to improve conditions in juvenile facilities.119 Section B 
examines the practical barriers of the IDEA to improving educational access in 
juvenile facilities for incarcerated youth with disabilities.120 Section C reviews 
current approaches relying on the ADA to improve educational access for stu-
                                                                                                                           
 113 See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 85–87 (receiving special education 
services increases the students risk for expulsion); Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 299 (describ-
ing the use of “inappropriate school-based referrals to law enforcement”). 
 114 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. Students receiving IDEA protections cost nearly two times 
more than students without disabilities. Id. The defendants in Mills v. Board of Education tried unsuc-
cessfully to excuse their lack of educational programming for students with disabilities on the finan-
cial strains of the school district. 348 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 115 See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (requiring exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies under the IDEA); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE 
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us0609webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JNB-7MZG] (highlighting litigation 
challenges rendered by the Prison Litigation Reform Act). 
 116 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) § 803(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2012 
& Supp. 2018) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 115, 
at 1–2. 
 117 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (detailing exhaustion requirement of administrative remedies under 
the IDEA); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 n.4 (2017) (refusing to answer a 
key question as to how far the exhaustion requirement extends). 
 118 See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., No. C 13-
3667-SBA (2013) [hereinafter First Amended Class Action Compl. in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty.] 
(using the ADA to challenge practices in a juvenile justice facility). 
 119 See infra notes 122–142 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 143–159 and accompanying text. 
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dents with disabilities in the school setting and incarcerated youth with disabil-
ities in juvenile justice facilities.121 
A. Statutory Exhaustion as an Obstacle to Litigation 
During the “tough on crime” era, Congress passed the PLRA, which ap-
plies to all incarcerated persons, including juveniles.122 PLRA makes it more 
difficult for all inmates to sustain litigation challenging facility conditions by 
outlining five requirements, including some prerequisites, for litigation.123 For 
example, an incarcerated juvenile must first pursue all facilities-based adminis-
trative procedures for remedying his or her cause of action before filing a law-
suit under federal law.124 An incarcerated juvenile with a disability may espe-
cially struggle to understand how to pursue an administrative grievance and yet 
still be prevented from pursuing a federal lawsuit.125 Furthermore, harnessing 
the expertise of counsel or the guidance of a parent when filing a grievance 
could jeopardize a juvenile’s ability to fulfill the exhaustion requirement and 
file a federal lawsuit if the juvenile did not personally submit the grievance.126 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See infra notes 160–181 and accompanying text. 
 122 Prison Litigation Reform Act § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 3636(g)(5) (2012) (defining prison within the 
context of the legislation). 
 123 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 115, at 1–2. As defined by Human Rights Watch, the five 
requirements are (1) exhaustion of remedies; (2) physical injury; (3) application to children; (4) re-
strictions on court oversight of prison conditions; and (5) limitations on attorney fees. Id. at 2. 
 124 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (creating an administrative exhaustion requirement that applies to 
all incarcerated individuals); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 115, at 2 (discussing application of 
the PLRA to juveniles). 
 125 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 115, at 16, 31 (highlighting conditions, such as dys-
lexia, mental illness, and blindness, that have prevented inmates from exhausting the administrative 
grievance system, which in turn, barred them from the federal court system, and how difficult these 
processes are for juvenile inmates with disabilities especially). A young woman incarcerated in Texas 
had her grievance application rejected because of her poor handwriting. Id. at 30. She struggled be-
cause of her lack of education. Id. 
 126 Id. at 32 & n.128 (citing El’Shabazz v. Philadelphia, 2007 WL 2155676, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(denying a father of an inmate the ability to advocate for his incarcerated son); Harris v. Baca, 2003 
WL 21384306, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (denying a lawyer the ability to advocate for his incarcerated 
client)). In Harris v. Baca, an inmate brought a civil rights complaint against corrections officials and 
a local sheriff’s office after he was allegedly beaten by the officials. 2003 WL 21384306, at *1. The 
inmate’s lawyer filed a grievance on his client’s behalf. Id. at *3. Reviewing a corresponding civil 
rights complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Judge 
Ronald S. W. Lew dismissed the complaint, given that the inmate had not exhausted the grievance 
process under the PLRA because the lawyer and not the inmate filed the complaint. Id. In El’Shabazz 
v. Philadelphia, an inmate claimed that his father filed grievances for him after he was beaten by pris-
on guards. 2007 WL 2155676, at *1, 3. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the inmate did not exhaust the administra-
tive procedures available to him. Id. at *1. The court explained that the father’s complaints, if they 
were lodged, would also not count toward the exhaustion requirement. Id. at *3. Cases like Harris and 
El’Shabazz abound throughout several jurisdictions. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 115, at 31–
33. 
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To further complicate the litigation strategy, when evaluating the rights of 
incarcerated juveniles with disabilities, the PLRA is not the only relevant fed-
eral statute that contains an administrative remedy exhaustion requirement.127 
Despite 2004 amendments to the IDEA meant to clarify the issue, the statute 
remains unclear as to whether the availability of its administrative remedies 
preempts bringing IDEA claims alongside other statutes that protect civil 
rights, including the ADA and Section 504.128 Prior to the amendments, a split 
amongst federal circuit courts arose as to whether a plaintiff must first exhaust 
all the administrative remedies available under the IDEA before bringing 
claims under alternative civil rights statutes.129 Additionally, some circuits ap-
                                                                                                                           
 127 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (establishing exhaustion of administrative procedures outlined in 
IDEA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (establishing exhaustion of grievance procedures in PLRA). The 
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is much broader than that of the IDEA. Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (No. 15-497) (explaining the United States’ posi-
tion on the exhaustion doctrine). 
 128 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (codifying the relationship between the IDEA and legislation protect-
ing against disability discrimination). The provision names the ADA and Title V of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 as not affected by this chapter of the IDEA. Id. Nevertheless, this provision also dictated 
that if the relief sought under either of those statutes was available under the IDEA, then the party 
filing the lawsuit needed to first exhaust the procedures in sections 1415(f) and (g) as though the law-
suit was being filed under the IDEA. Id. Section 1415(f) provides for an “impartial due process hear-
ing” led by an impartial hearing officer. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A)–(3)(A) (outlining the components of a fair 
hearing under the IDEA). Section 1415(g) provides for an appeal process after the hearing from sec-
tion 1415(f), if that hearing was conducted by the local, and not state, educational agency. Id. 
§ 1415(g)(1). In that situation, the state educational agency appoints an impartial hearing officer to 
make an assessment. Id. § 1415(g)(2). Typically, the relief available under the IDEA is injunctive in 
nature and relates to remedying the lack of a “free, appropriate public education,” or a “FAPE.” Perry 
A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 214, 219 (2013) (condensing the typical paths of IDEA litigation). Although the IDEA 
does not provide for monetary damages, such relief is available under other civil rights statutes. See 
JOHN PARRY, AM. BAR ASS’N, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 
365 (2008) (discussing forms of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act); Zirkel, supra, at 220 (explaining lack of monetary relief available under the IDEA). 
 129 See PARRY, supra note 128, at 364–65 (discussing the diverse treatment of the IDEA’s ex-
haustion and futility doctrines in the federal courts). Under varying circumstances and to varying 
degrees, the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have required exhaustion of 
the IDEA’s administrative remedies before bringing a claim for damages under other statutes. See 
Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the exhaustion doctrine 
of the IDEA applies only to claims that seek relief available in the IDEA, regardless of whether the 
claim requests relief under that statute); Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 
288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting the claims of a visually impaired high school student, brought 
under the ADA and Section 504, because the plaintiff did not pursue, much less exhaust, all of the 
IDEA’s administrative remedies first); Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 56–57 (1st Cir. 
2002) (requiring plaintiffs—a high school graduate with a disability and her parents—to exhaust all 
administrative remedies under the IDEA because they alleged a denial of a FAPE, even though they 
brought their claim under a civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and not the IDEA so they could 
pursue monetary damages against the school district); Padilla v. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (recognizing that exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative remedies is required where the 
“source and nature of the alleged injuries” could be remedied under the IDEA and favoring exhaustion 
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plied a futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine, but the definition of futili-
ty varies by circuit.130 Some circuits base futility on whether the specific reme-
dy sought by the plaintiffs, such as monetary damages, is available under the 
IDEA while other circuits recognize that, though the IDEA’s administrative 
procedures could be applied, the procedures would not likely fix the alleged 
injuries.131 
In 2017, in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, the Supreme Court 
sought to cure the circuit split, holding that the exhaustion doctrine only ap-
plies when the plaintiff is alleging that he or she was denied a “free, appropri-
ate public education,” or a “FAPE.”132 Here, the parents of a child with cere-
bral palsy filed a complaint under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 when 
their child’s school barred her from bringing her service dog to school.133 No-
                                                                                                                           
under the IDEA in unclear situations); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 68, 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that, the exhaustion doctrine applies when relief is available under the IDEA that would 
potentially address the plaintiff’s complaints, but whether it is the relief that the plaintiff desires is 
irrelevant); N.B. v. Alachua Cty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
dismissal of the suit on failure to exhaust grounds and explaining that moving out of the school district 
does not render the relief under the IDEA futile). The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Payne is particularly 
instructive because it happened after the 2004 amendments to the IDEA. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 871 
(finding an exhaustion requirement in 2011). 
 130 See PARRY, supra note 128, at 364–65 (discussing various applications of the exhaustion doc-
trine and the futility exception). 
 131 See id. (providing examples of different circuits’ definitions of futility when applied to IDEA-
based cases). The Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized some form of a futility exception to the 
exhaustion doctrine whereas the First Circuit has stated that futility in regards to the type of remedy 
sought makes no difference. Compare Payne, 653 F.3d at 889 n.3 (recognizing, in the Ninth Circuit, 
the futility exception exists but was not appropriately raised in this case), and J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Atti-
ca Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing the futility exception where the IDEA 
would “not provide an adequate remedy”), with Frazier, 276 F.3d at 63 (refusing to find utility for a 
claim for monetary damages when the IDEA does not provide monetary damages, the kind of relief 
sought). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that a futility exception to the IDEA does not provide the 
most suitable remedy when compared to a different civil rights statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Covington v. Knox Cty. Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s 
rights could be remedied successfully with damages alone). 
 132 See Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748, 752 (qualifying the meaning of the IDEA’s exhaustion doctrine and 
acknowledging the circuit split). In describing the administrative procedures available under the 
IDEA, the Court noted that these procedures often revolve around parents of a student with a disabil-
ity and the student’s school coming to an agreement as to what services and goals should be included 
in the student’s IEP. Id. at 749. The Court characterized a FAPE as “the IDEA’s core guarantee.” Id. 
at 748. 
 133 Id. at 750, 752. Title II of the ADA, which applies to all public entities, and Section 504, 
which applies to programs that receive federal funds, both applied to a public school that received 
money from the federal government under the IDEA. See id. at 749 (explaining how the IDEA impos-
es the right to an education through the states and the scope of other civil rights and disability-related 
federal statutes). The service dog, Wonder, helped the child, E.F., manage physical tasks with greater 
independence. Id. at 751. When E.F. went to kindergarten, the school provided a paraprofessional to 
assist with her needs, and so Wonder was banned. Id. Though the school eventually acquiesced to a 
trial period with the dog in tow, Wonder was not allowed to interact with E.F. and the school then 
reaffirmed Wonder’s banishment. Id. An investigation by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office 
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tably, the parents did not file suit under the IDEA, and subsequently, they did 
not argue that she was being denied her right to a FAPE.134 This decision was 
likely strategic, because unlike the IDEA, both the ADA and Section 504 could 
provide for monetary damages.135 The defendant-school district, however, 
challenged this strategy by arguing that the plaintiffs were required, but had 
failed, to seek the necessary remedies under the IDEA before they could seek 
relief under the civil rights statutes.136 
The Supreme Court’s holding was two-fold.137 First, the “suit must seek 
relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only ‘relief’” offered under 
the IDEA.138 Second, whether the denial of FAPE is at issue can be determined 
by a careful examination of the complaint.139 Therefore, the IDEA’s exhaustion 
doctrine of the IDEA only applies when the plaintiff alleges that he or she was 
not receiving a FAPE.140 Pertinent to potential claims in the context of correc-
tional education for incarcerated juveniles with disabilities, the Court consid-
ered a hypothetical lawsuit that used the ADA and not the IDEA to assert a 
lack of educational access and found that the exhaustion doctrine could still 
                                                                                                                           
of Civil Rights resulted in a finding that banning the service dog was discriminatory under the ADA 
and Section 504, even if the school was providing services that allowed E.F. to access a FAPE. Id. 
Subsequently, E.F.’s school approved Wonder’s presence at the school but, due to E.F.’s parents’ 
lingering concerns about the school’s unwelcoming climate for their child and her needs, they trans-
ferred her to a different public school. Id. 
 134 See id. at 752 (detailing the complaint for discrimination under the ADA and Section 504). 
 135 See id. at 750, 752 n.4 (discussing remedies available under the ADA, Section 504, and the 
IDEA). E.F.’s parents sought monetary and declaratory relief for the infliction of “emotional distress 
and pain, embarrassment, and mental anguish.” Id. at 752 (internal quotations omitted). 
 136 Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, No. 12-15507, 2014 WL 106624, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
10, 2014). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the suit 
under the IDEA’s exhaustion doctrine. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the 1996 Charlie F. decision from the Seventh Circuit. Id. The Sixth 
Circuit saw E.F.’s parents’ claims as rooted in the IDEA because they “were educational in nature.” 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 137 Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752. 
 138 Id. Under the IDEA’s procedures, which are at the center of the exhaustion doctrine, the hear-
ing officer can only provide relief that remedies a denial of FAPE. Id. at 754. Such relief would likely 
materialize through changes in the child’s IEP. See id. at 753 (describing how the FAPE mandate of 
the IDEA is upheld through the use of the IEP and delivered through the services proscribed in the 
IEP). 
 139 Id. at 752. The Court recognized various approaches to determining whether a plaintiff alleged 
a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 755. It rejected, for example, a bright-line rule stating that the use of terms 
of art from the IDEA, such as “FAPE” or “IEP,” indicate that the claimant implicitly seeks relief that 
the IDEA could provide. Id. The Court used hypotheticals to illustrate its point. Id. at 756. For in-
stance, if the complaint alleged injuries that would be considered discriminatory if carried out by 
public places other than a school or if committed against an adult instead of child, then the lawsuit 
was probably not about a FAPE. Id. 
 140 Id. at 754. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to address whether the 
lawsuit was about the denial of a FAPE according to the Court’s new two-part framework. Id. at 758. 
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come into play.141 Furthermore, the Court left open a question that plagued the 
circuit courts: whether, when alleging a denial of FAPE, a plaintiff seeking 
relief not available under the IDEA, such as monetary damages, must still ex-
haust all the relief that is available under the IDEA.142 
B. Practical Implications of Using the IDEA to Advance Educational Rights 
for Incarcerated Juveniles with Disabilities 
The IDEA requires all students diagnosed with one of the IDEA’s qualify-
ing disabilities to have an “individualized education program,” or an “IEP,” if the 
local educational agency, usually the student’s school district, finds that the stu-
dent requires personalized instruction.143 If an incarcerated student has an IEP, 
then he or she is entitled to the fulfillment of those needs and accommodations 
under the IDEA.144 In practice, however, the IDEA’s mandates may create addi-
tional barriers to accessing education for incarcerated juveniles with disabili-
ties.145 First, the student must be diagnosed with one of the disabilities outlined 
in the IDEA.146 Second, the student must have been found by an evaluation to 
need “special education and related services.”147 Third, the student must have a 
current IEP or the juvenile justice facility must be willing to craft one for the 
student in question.148 Rather than protecting incarcerated juveniles with disa-
bilities, these three mandates are rarely fulfilled while they are incarcerated.149 
The IEP also dictates how the school district must accommodate the stu-
dent’s disability so that he or she may access his or her education in the “least 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 757 (discussing a hypothetical ADA lawsuit that dealt with potential discrimination 
but also the lack of a FAPE, even if FAPE was not mentioned by name). The Supreme Court’s exam-
ple leaves open the possibility that a reviewing court could find that the educational access claim was 
geared toward a public entity that was not a school, such as the correctional facility itself. See id. (de-
bating whether the claim regarding a lack of tutoring could be produced against “a public theater or a 
library”). 
 142 See id. at 752 n.4 (refusing to answer the question in this case); see, e.g., Frazier, 276 F.3d at 
56–57 (enforcing the exhaustion doctrine despite a claim for monetary damages). 
 143 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West 2017). 
 144 Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 295. 
 145 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (limiting the IDEA’s protections to certain disabili-
ties and requiring a determination of the need for services), § 1414(a)(1)(A) (requiring evaluations to 
determine eligibility). 
 146 Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). 
 147 See id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (determining eligibility for services if child has a qualifying disabil-
ity), § 1414(a)(1)(A) (requiring evaluation before services are provided). 
 148 See Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 295 (discussing the rights of juveniles, including 
those incarcerated, who fall within the IDEA’s eligibility framework); JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES 
INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 136 (asking about conformity with IEP development that is in compli-
ance with the IDEA). 
 149 See Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 301–02 (discussing incarcerated juveniles’ lack of 
access to special education that meets IDEA requirements and how facilities fail to meet the require-
ments of the IDEA). 
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restrictive environment,” or “LRE.”150 This individualized, least restrictive 
setting requirement may not be properly implemented by the correctional 
facility if it defines “least restrictive” based on the kinds of security settings 
available rather than the juvenile’s learning needs.151 Transition planning, 
which documents the student’s plans after high school and sets measurable 
goals for the student to be prepared to pursue those plans, must be incorporated 
into the IEP that is in place when the student turns sixteen.152 For incarcerated 
juveniles, however, these transition plans often never happen because facility 
staff lacks the proper skills to craft them, resulting both in lack of family en-
gagement and in incomplete school records from which to work. 153 
The IDEA has been used successfully by advocates attempting to advance 
the educational rights of incarcerated juveniles.154 For example, in 1993, ten 
juveniles aged eleven to sixteen brought a class action lawsuit against several 
public officials of the State of Connecticut challenging confinement condi-
tions, including educational access, in juvenile detention facilities in Connecti-
cut’s three urban centers, Bridgeport, Hartford, and New Haven.155 Because 
some plaintiffs qualified for special education services by their public school 
districts, the lawsuit included a claim under the IDEA.156 The parties were able 
to reach a settlement that provided for more services.157 Changes in facilities 
                                                                                                                           
 150 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 151 See id. (defining “least restrictive” settings for all facilities); JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES 
INITIATIVE, supra note 89, at 137 (describing what does not constitute a least restrictive environment); 
LEONE & WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 21 (identifying the tension between security and education). 
 152 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(34) (defining transition planning), § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (explaining 
when and how transition planning is incorporated into the IEP). Incarcerated juveniles with IEPs are 
entitled to transition plans that account for postsecondary goals. JUVENILE DET. ALTERNATIVES INI-
TIATIVE, supra note 89, at 136 (inquiring about conformity with IEP-centered transition planning). 
 153 LEONE & WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 22. 
 154 See, e.g., Emily J. v. Weicker, CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY, https://cca-ct.org/pleadings
bank/pleadingsbank_federal/emily-j-v-weicker-complaint-conditions-of-confinement-medical-mental-
health-care [https://perma.cc/BD66-PAXM] [hereinafter CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY] (repro-
ducing the pleading of a class action lawsuit in Connecticut brought under the IDEA and Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. The lawsuit characterizes the plaintiffs as “handicapped children.” Id. In this Note, the 
plaintiffs will be described as children with disabilities. See NAT’L YOUTH LEADERSHIP NETWORK & 
KIDS AS SELF-ADVOCATES, RESPECTFUL DISABILITY LANGUAGE: HERE’S WHAT’S UP! 2 (2012), 
http://www.aucd.org/docs/add/sa_summits/Language%20Doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/L98P-XQ26] 
(offering respectful terminology when discussing disabilities). Emily J. was a thirteen-year-old girl 
who was placed in special education services in Bridgeport Public Schools until she was removed 
from the program due to truancy. CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY, supra note 154. Bridgeport 
Juvenile Detention Center staff kept her locked in a cell for days on end throughout her confinement 
period without access to toilet facilities, much less educational services. Id. Her mental health and 
medication needs were also mismanaged. See id. (describing forgotten dosages and lack of therapeutic 
services). 
 157 Settlement Agreement at 9, Emily J. v. Rell, No. 3:93-cv-01944-RNC (2005) (dictating the 
ultimate settlement agreement between the parties). 
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brought by lawsuits under the IDEA will not necessarily reach incarcerated 
students who do not fall within the protections of the IDEA but who are still 
living with a disability.158 IDEA litigation is also limited in scope as the court 
can only remedy the denial of a FAPE.159 
C. Current Approaches to Using the ADA as an  
Educational Advocacy Tool 
The ADA has been used to address disability discrimination by school of-
ficials against individual students, as well as to challenge placement in restric-
tive environments on behalf of classes of students.160 Recent class action cases 
serve as examples for ADA-based, class action facilities litigation, which 
would also challenge restrictive environments that impede educational ac-
cess.161 In one such class action, in 2015 in the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, the Parent/Professional Advocacy League, and 
the Disability Law Center, on behalf of a class of students with mental health 
disabilities, filed a complaint against the City of Springfield seeking remedy 
under the ADA.162 The plaintiffs alleged that the City violated the ADA by 
keeping students segregated in a placement that used improper behavior man-
agement techniques rather than providing appropriate therapeutic services to 
students with mental health disabilities in Springfield Public Schools’ neigh-
borhood schools.163 The United States filed a statement of interest that chal-
                                                                                                                           
 158 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (West 2017) (defining eligibility under the IDEA); LEONE & 
WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 25 (highlighting the retention of IDEA rights while in juvenile facilities 
but also explaining the broader disability definition under the ADA and Section 504 when compared 
to IDEA); Zirkel, supra note 128, at 215 (proscribing litigation under the IDEA as limited to pursuit 
of a FAPE through the identified student’s IDEA-mandated IEP). Although anywhere from fifty to 
eighty percent of incarcerated youth could be eligible under the IDEA, in 2011, an estimated thirty-
three percent were actually identified as qualifying for IDEA-related services. Dale et al., supra note 
90, § 2.01[5][a]; Adam Segal, IDEA and the Juvenile Justice System: A Factsheet, THE NAT’L TECH. 
ASSISTANCE CTR. FOR THE EDUC. OF NEGLECTED OR DELINQUENT CHILDREN AND YOUTH, https://
neglected-delinquent.ed.gov/idea-and-juvenile-justice-system-factsheet [https://perma.cc/D6UF-
CBGM] (offering statistics on special education eligibility within the juvenile justice system). 
 159 Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754 n.7. 
 160 See, e.g., id. at 752 (bringing suit under the ADA for damages stemming from disability-based 
discrimination against a student with a service animal); Class Action Complaint at 1, Doe v. Pasadena 
Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:16-CV-00984-BRO-DGS (2016) [hereinafter Class Action Compl. in Doe v. 
Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist.] (arguing against the use of restraints and a highly restrictive physical 
environment); First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, 2, S.S. v. City of Springfield, Civil No. 
3:14-30116, ECF No. 53 (2015) [hereinafter First Amended Class Action Compl. in S.S. v. City of 
Springfield] (arguing against use of restraints and highly restrictive physical environment). 
 161 See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Compl. in S.S. v. City of Springfield, supra note 160, at 
2 (challenging the school’s use of isolation as a behavior policy); Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Con-
tra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 6 (detailing use of isolation to address behavior). 
 162 First Amended Class Action Compl. in S.S. v. City of Springfield, supra note 160, at 1, 2. 
 163 Id. at 2. The complaint details the use of “physical restraints” and “inappropriate forced isola-
tion.” Id. Springfield Public Schools operates the Public Day School for elementary through high 
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lenged the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of administrative exhaustion 
under the IDEA and instead supported the non-application of the IDEA’s ex-
haustion doctrine for a lawsuit bringing the ADA claim.164 Unfortunately, the 
court held that the plaintiffs were required to meet the IDEA’s exhaustion doc-
trine and failed to do so.165 
In 2016, in the United States District Court for the Central Division of 
California, advocacy groups brought a similar class-action lawsuit on behalf of 
students with mental health disabilities against the Pasadena Unified School 
District.166 The complaint alleged that the district’s use of its Focus Point 
Academy as a separate placement for students with mental disabilities and the 
use of behavioral policies like physical restraints and isolation violated the 
ADA.167 Attorneys for the students with disabilities argued that, to meet the 
                                                                                                                           
school students on separate campuses. Id. at 14. The Public Day School program educates 233 stu-
dents with emotional disabilities, keeping them completely separate from students without disabilities. 
Id. at 14, 16. The complaint alleges that the school provides impermissibly low-level academics, fo-
cuses on punitive measures to control behavior, and results in students dropping out or being arrested 
at school and sent to juvenile justice facilities. Id. at 15–16. The Public Day School also fails to pro-
vide supplemental opportunities to its students, like extracurricular activities and sports. Id. at 16. The 
Public Day School also counsels families out to equally restrictive private schools. Id. For a student 
with a disability, like plaintiff S.S., who wants to be integrated into a mainstream school setting, the 
Public Day School allegedly does not provide integration as an option. See id. at 18–19 (discussing 
S.S.’s desire to attend one of the specialized high school programs coupled with his ability to be edu-
cated in the high school setting but how he was barred from applying). 
 164 Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, S.S. v. City of Springfield, No.14-
cv-30116-MGM (Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Statement of Interest in S.S. v. City of Springfield] 
(supporting the claims and litigation strategy of the plaintiffs). The United States disagreed with the 
defendants’ interpretation of the IDEA’s exhaustion doctrine and noted that an ADA claim could be 
brought in lieu of or alongside an IDEA claim because the statutes protect and advance different 
rights. Id. The United States expressed an interest in the accurate interpretation of the ADA and the 
proper enforcement of its mandates. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs filed the First Amended Class Action 
Complaint after the United States filed its Statement of Interest. See First Amended Class Action 
Compl. in S.S. v. City of Springfield, supra note 160, at 1 (filed Feb. 11, 2015); Statement of Interest 
in S.S. v. City of Springfield¸ supra, at 16 (filed Aug. 27, 2014). The administrative hearing officer 
dismissed all the ADA claims brought by one of the students with a mental health disability, S.S., and 
found that the school environment and the IEP of S.S. fulfilled the mandates of the IDEA. First 
Amended Class Action Compl. in S.S. v. City of Springfield, supra note 160, at 5. 
 165 S.S. by S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 332 F. Supp. 3d 367, 378 (D. Mass. 2019). The plaintiffs 
have filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and defendants have 
cross-appealed. Notice of Appeal of Court’s Order from 09/05/2018, S.S. v. City of Springfield, Civil 
No. 3:14-30116-MGM, ECF No. 286 (D. Mass. Oct. 5, 2018); Notice of Appeal, S.S. v. City of 
Springfield, Civil No. 3:14-30116-MGM, ECF No. 281 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2018) (filing by interve-
nors); Notice of Appeal, S.S. v. City of Springfield, Civil No. 3:14-30116-MGM, ECF No. 267 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 9, 2018) (filing by original plaintiff). 
 166 Class Action Compl. in Doe v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 160, at 1 (challenging 
certain behavior management techniques and separate campuses). 
 167 Id. 
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mandates of the ADA, these students could be educated with the proper sup-
ports, such as behavior services, in the district’s neighborhood schools.168 
Advocates have also begun to use the ADA as an educational advocacy 
tool by challenging conditions of confinement as barriers to educational ac-
cess.169 The recent leading case using this approach settled, however, which 
poses difficulties in determining how courts may treat this approach in the fu-
ture.170 In that case, in 2014, in G.F. v. Contra Costa County, advocates 
brought suit under the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA on behalf of a group 
of juveniles with disabilities incarcerated at the Contra Costa County’s Juve-
nile Hall.171 They alleged that the facility relied on restrictive tactics like soli-
tary confinement to address concerning behaviors rather than providing youth 
with the services they needed.172 Furthermore, when the juveniles were placed 
in solitary, they were denied access to education.173 The United States Depart-
ment of Justice filed a statement of interest to affirm its role in enforcing the 
ADA, provide its interpretation of the ADA’s mandates, and express concerns 
about the use of solitary confinement in juvenile facilities.174 
At the time of the actions alleged in the complaint, nearly thirty-three 
percent of youth enrolled at the detention center’s school qualified for IEPs.175 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id. at 1–2. This case is ongoing pending the school district’s final approval of a settlement. Ex. 
A, Statement of Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, Doe v. Pasadena Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., No. 2:16-CV-00984 BRO-DGS (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018), ECF No. 141 (providing a 
recent update on the status of the case). 
 169 See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 15, 24 (advocating for use of the ADA to challenge use 
of solitary confinement and advocate for “reasonable modifications” to programming and highlighting 
the G.F. v. Contra Costa County case as an approach to challenging conditions’ impediment to educa-
tion). 
 170 See id. at 24 (discussing the settlement agreement). 
 171 Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 2; First Amended Class 
Action Compl. in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 118, at 3–4; see also Individuals with Disabil-
ities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (protecting the educational interests of 
students with disabilities); Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2017) (guarding against disa-
bility-based discrimination); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (pro-
tecting persons with disabilities from disability-based discrimination). The maximum-security John A. 
Davis Juvenile Hall can house up to 290 juveniles and has on-site educational facilities and mental 
health services. John A. Davis Juvenile Hall, CONTRA COSTA CTY., http://www.co.contra-costa.
ca.us/680/John-A-Davis-Juvenile-Hall [https://perma.cc/RR4P-WRD3] (describing the features of the 
John A. Davis Juvenile Hall). 
 172 First Amended Class Action Compl. in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 118, at 1. 
 173 Id. At Contra Costa County’s Juvenile Hall, youth were confined to their cells for upwards of 
twenty-two hours per day and denied accessed to all group programming. Statement of Interest in G.F. 
v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 1 n.1. Given these conditions, the plaintiffs in the case referred 
to such restrictive methods as solitary confinement. Id. At the Juvenile Hall, the most restrictive levels 
of security—maximum and security risk—barred plaintiffs from attending any educational program-
ming, including special education. Id. at 5. For “special program” youth, a third level within the most 
restrictive levels of security, tutors were provided for upwards of thirty minutes of instruction in a day 
but not every day. Id. 
 174 Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 2. 
 175 Id. at 4. 
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By bringing an IDEA claim, plaintiffs argued that relegating them to these re-
strictive security programs violated their right to education in the least restric-
tive environment with appropriate accommodations that would meet the “indi-
vidualized” characterization of the IEP.176 The three plaintiffs in the case also 
had disabilities recognized under the ADA.177 They argued that, because of 
their disabilities, they were disproportionately affected by these removal poli-
cies and thus were suffering from discrimination.178 The Department of Jus-
tice’s Statement of Interest highlighted that the county’s correctional and edu-
cation agencies shared responsibility for following the IDEA and the ADA.179 
Taking as true plaintiff’s allegations, the Department believed that the plain-
tiffs had asserted violations of these federal statutes and thus the county’s prac-
tices could be found discriminatory.180 Ultimately the parties settled in 2015.181 
IV. HOW THE ADA HOLDS PROMISE FOR ENFORCING THE EDUCATIONAL 
RIGHTS OF INCARCERATED JUVENILES 
Juvenile justice facilities’ frequent use of security policies, like solitary 
confinement, are used to justify denying educational access to preserve inmate 
and staff safety.182 Using the ADA to promote educational access for incarcer-
ated juveniles with disabilities is newly charted territory, but the few cases that 
have attempted this strategy show early signs of its efficacy.183 Section A of 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. at 7. Restrictive security programs necessitated removal from school in violation of the 
manifestation hearing requirement under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (discussing procedures 
required before removing a student with a disability from school due to behaviors potentially stem-
ming from the disability). 
 177 Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 5. W.B. was “diagnosed 
with psychosis and schizophrenia,” G.F. with “bipolar affective disorder, attention deficit and hyper-
activity disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder,” and Q.G. with “oppositional defiant disorder 
and attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder.” Id. at 5–6. W.B. was placed in restrictive security 
programs for sixty days over the course of four months, G.F. for one hundred days in twelve months, 
and Q.G. for more than two hundred days in upwards of three years. Id. 
 178 Id. at 6. 
 179 Id. at 9–10. The agencies were seemingly trying to off-load responsibility to one another, 
thereby creating a dearth of protection for the plaintiff’s rights. Id. 
 180 Id. at 18. 
 181 FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 24. The settlement reduced the use and length of solitary 
confinement and required the facility to meet the needs of students with disabilities. G.F. et al. v. 
Contra Costa County et al., DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES, http://dralegal.org/case/g-f-et-al-v-
contra-costa-county-et-al [https://perma.cc/M843-ACTX] [hereinafter DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVO-
CATES] (outlining the ultimate settlement reached by the parties). 
 182 See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6 (citing use of prolonged solitary confinement in “al-
most half of juvenile detention facilities and training schools”). 
 183 See, e.g., Class Action Compl. in Doe v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 160, at 1–2 
(continuing to pursue ADA claims against a school district to challenge restrictive practices); Elec-
tronic Notice of ADR Conference, supra note 165, (“filed under seal,” referring the matter to alterna-
tive dispute resolution in an ADA case against a school district that challenged the use of restrictive 
practices); DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES, supra note 181. 
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this Part outlines the benefits of using the ADA in conjunction with or instead 
of the IDEA to advance public education access for incarcerated juveniles with 
disabilities.184 Section B of this Part provides a blueprint for advocates when 
using the ADA that could result in a complete overhaul of the juvenile justice 
facilities across the country.185 
A. Benefits of the ADA as an Educational Advocacy Tool  
for Incarcerated Juveniles with Disabilities 
Claims can be brought in federal court under either the IDEA or ADA or 
both.186 As a civil rights statute, the ADA lacks the prescriptiveness of the 
IDEA when it comes to advancing the educational rights of those with disabili-
ties.187 Instead, the ADA’s breadth allows advocates to focus on the impact a 
disability may have on the juvenile’s life.188 Further, whereas the IDEA centers 
on educational agencies, Title II of the ADA focuses on the actions of any pub-
lic entity.189 In juvenile facilities that delegate the provision of all educational 
or special education services from the corrections agency to the educational 
agency, the ADA would apply to both entities.190 The IDEA, by contrast, 
would only apply to an educational agency.191 Under the ADA, the correctional 
and educational environments must work together to ensure, for example, that 
disciplinary action, like solitary confinement, does not impede access to a pub-
lic service like special education.192 The expansiveness of the ADA demon-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See infra notes 186–192 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 194–203 and accompanying text. 
 186 Statement of Interest in S.S. v. City of Springfield¸ supra note 164, at 2. 
 187 Compare Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012) (defining disa-
bility and its impact under the ADA), and id. §12132 (banning discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity by any “public entity”), with Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (West 2017) (defining the narrow rights as to educational access available 
under the IDEA). 
 188 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining the impact on daily living and framing the scope of the 
ADA’s protections); LEONE & WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 25 (discussing expansive coverage of the 
ADA’s protections on individuals with disabilities and their families). 
 189 Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(19)(A) (defining “local educational agency” as the deliverer of 
the IDEA services and protections), with 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (defining the scope of the protections to 
all public entities and their services). 
 190 See Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 13 (applying the ADA 
to both the correctional and educational entities of the facility); Boundy & Karger, supra note 18, at 
302–03. 
 191 See Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the appli-
cation of the IDEA solely to the county’s educational board). 
 192 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (scope of the ADA); Statement of Interest in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., 
supra note 3, at 13 (applying the ADA to both the correctional and educational entities of the facility). 
2019] Who Will Educate Me? 705 
strates how it will improve conditions for incarcerated juveniles with disabili-
ties.193 
B. Blueprint for Advocacy: Using the ADA to Secure the Educational Rights 
of Incarcerated Juveniles with Disabilities 
Advocates who wish to use the ADA as a vehicle for securing the rights 
of incarcerated juveniles with disabilities need not stop at access to educational 
services.194 Because the ADA includes all conditions of confinement, not just 
education, advocates can use the ADA to challenge a range of facility opera-
tions that impact education.195 This Section endeavors to provide advocates 
with a blueprint for challenging conditions of juvenile justice facilities in order 
to advance the educational rights of incarcerated youth with disabilities and 
ultimately, shut down or overhaul facilities that fail to uphold all incarcerated 
juveniles’ civil rights.196 
`First, advocates for incarcerated juveniles with disabilities must consider 
the limitations wrought by the PLRA’s and the IDEA’s separate exhaustion 
doctrines.197 When considering the exhaustion doctrine of the PLRA, advo-
cates need to ensure that potential juvenile plaintiffs have pursued grievances 
first through the facility’s formal process.198 Fulfilling the PLRA mandate re-
quires close attention to its processes and those of the juvenile justice facili-
ty.199 Accounting for the exhaustion doctrine of the IDEA when advocating for 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (engulfing all public entities within the ADA’s protection for 
persons with disabilities). 
 194 See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 (recommending a variety of challenges to practices 
in juvenile facilities under the ADA). 
 195 See First Amended Class Action Compl. in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 118, at 1 
(connecting facility’s use of solitary confinement to deteriorating educational progress and behaviors 
that result in more solitary confinement); FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 (discussing ADA 
challenges to lack of integration and mental health services). 
 196 See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. See generally BEDI, supra note 9. 
 197 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012) (requiring exhaustion of the IDEA’s remedies); Prisoner Liti-
gation Reform Act § 803(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2012 & Supp. 2018) (requiring exhaustion 
of the correctional facility’s remedies under the PLRA). Incarcerated juveniles with disabilities face 
extra obstacles to their lawsuits because they are both inmates and students with disabilities. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(l) (explaining scope of exhaustion under IDEA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (explaining 
the scope of exhaustion under PLRA). 
 198 See, e.g., El’Shabazz v. Philadelphia, 2007 WL 2155676, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2007) (dis-
missing suit for failure to exhaust); Harris v. Le Roy Baca, 2003 WL 21384306, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 
11, 2003) (same). 
 199 See, e.g., El’Shabazz, 2007 WL 2155676, at *3 (refusing to recognize grievances filed on the 
inmate’s behalf by the inmate’s father); Harris, 2003 WL 21384306, at *3 (refusing to recognize 
grievances filed on the inmate’s behalf by the inmate’s lawyer); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
115, at 30 (denying a grievance claim by an incarcerated juvenile because of poor handwriting). 
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the educational rights of incarcerated juveniles with disabilities requires great-
er exploration of potential plaintiffs’ unique situations.200 
Additionally, advocates must distinguish between incarcerated juveniles 
with IEPs addressing their IDEA-recognized disabilities and those who have 
not been identified as having a disability under the IDEA.201 For those who are 
not identified, advocates should examine the IDEA’s definition of disability 
and determine whether a juvenile needs to be identified as having a disability 
and also requiring disability-related services through the IDEA’s evaluation 
process.202 For juveniles who are determined to have both a disability and 
rights to special education services under the IDEA, however, prudent advo-
cates would be wise first to pursue the IDEA’s administrative remedies to 
avoid dismissal of the suit.203 Given the prevalence of disabilities in incarcer-
ated juveniles, if the IDEA does not apply, the juvenile may still have a disabil-
ity recognizable under the ADA’s broader definition of disability.204 If that is 
the case, then advocates should avoid the murky waters of the IDEA’s exhaus-
tion requirement in favor of litigation that challenges facilities conditions and 
their impact on education.205 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the United States has recognized the right of students with 
disabilities to access a public education. Federal statutes, like the IDEA, and 
recent major federal cases, like Board of Education v. Rowley and Endrew F. v. 
Douglas County School District RE-1, have institutionalized the right to a 
“free, appropriate public education” in the “least restrictive environment” to 
make “effective progress” for youth with disabilities in public schools across 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See PARRY, supra note 128, at 364–65 (describing various applications of the IDEA’s exhaus-
tion doctrine). 
 201 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (West 2017) (defining a child with a disability under the 
IDEA), § 1414(d) (discussing the purpose and application of IEPs). 
 202 See id. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (providing an explicit list of disabilities covered by the statute’s 
protection and requiring the child with a qualifying disability to also need services provided), 
§ 1414(b) (explaining the evaluation process). If the juvenile is eligible for services under the IDEA, 
then the IDEA’s exhaustion doctrine applies to remedies available under the IDEA. See id. § 1414(l) 
(explaining exhaustion procedures under the IDEA). 
 203 See id. § 1414(l). Advocates could consider arguing a futility exception to the exhaustion doc-
trine, but the ultimate determination of futility is made by the courts after the lawsuit is filed. See 
PARRY, supra note 128, at 364–65 (discussing varying degrees of success in different circuits with the 
futility exception). 
 204 See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 108, at 7 (estimating upwards of seven-
ty percent of youth involved in the juvenile justice system could qualify as having a disability under 
the ADA). 
 205 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(l) (outlining the exhaustion doctrine of the IDEA); First Amended 
Class Action Compl. in G.F. v. Contra Costa Cty., supra note 118, at 1 (linking conditions to deplora-
ble education standards); FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 (demonstrating how the ADA can be 
used to challenge various conditions of confinement). 
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the country. These statutes and cases also guarantee affected students important 
procedural protections. Unfortunately, the IDEA’s mandates have fallen short 
for incarcerated juveniles with disabilities. Emotional disabilities, learning dis-
abilities, and mental illness are overrepresented in our juvenile justice 
facilities. Moreover, these facilities, built upon principals of rehabilitation, are 
not providing incarcerated youth with disabilities with the educational services 
they deserve. Juvenile justice facilities struggle to provide proper educational 
services in the appropriate educational environment and clamp down on be-
havior through the use of damaging practices, like solitary confinement. Facili-
ties managers also fail to consider that untreated mental illness and emotional 
disabilities create undesired behaviors and that the security policies themselves 
often exacerbate these clinical root causes. 
Traditionally, the educational rights of students with disabilities are 
examined through the lens of the IDEA. The IDEA can successfully secure 
education for some incarcerated juveniles with disabilities, but it leaves behind 
those who are not identified under the IDEA or do not have an IDEA-qualified 
disability. Legal advocates should consider students’ statutory rights to access 
public services under the ADA instead of or in addition to students’ right to 
access a public education under the IDEA. In the last few years, a flurry of 
disability rights lawsuits that include the ADA in their claims has resulted in 
settlements geared toward remedying systemic civil rights injuries by improv-
ing conditions of confinement, including providing appropriate education ser-
vices. Incarcerated youth are a captive audience, both literally and figuratively, 
for academic instruction. By advocating for specialized educational services, 
incarcerated youth with disabilities stand a far better chance of successful 
reentry and reduced recidivism than when their educational needs are ignored. 
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